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Tyler. Vindication of the Strictures on the Review of Dr. Spring's Dissertation. 1830

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A

VINDICATION

OF THE

STRICTURES ON THE REVIEW

OF

DR. SPRING'S DISSERTATION

ON THE

MEANS OF REGENERATION,

IN THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR FOR 1829,

IN REPLY TO THE

REVIEWER AND EVANGELUS PACIFICUS.

BY BENNET TYLER, D. D.
Pastor of the Second Congregational Church, in Portland, Maine.

PORTLAND:
SHIRLEY AND HYDE, EXCHANGE-STREET.
1830.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE Reviewer expresses his regret, that I should have prepared an answer to his remarks on the means of regeneration, before he had brought them to a close. But why this regret? Does he mean to admit that his system is not fully developed in his first three numbers, or that there is any discordance between his last statements, and those which he had previously made? Certainly not. But he says, "Most of the objections which Dr. Tyler has urged against our Review, were met by anticipation in our closing number." To this I reply, that had they been satisfactorily met and obviated, the strictures would have been suppressed. But as they were not satisfactorily obviated, and as the Reviewer had retracted nothing which he had previously published, I saw no sufficient reason for suppressing or altering the strictures. But says the Reviewer, "with these explanations in his hands, that Dr. Tyler should still go forward to publish his Strictures in their original shape, and thus create in the minds of hundreds who will never see our Review, the settled conviction, that we maintain opinions which we have unequivocally disclaimed; has excited in our minds, we acknowledge, no small degree of surprise." In this statement there is an implied allegation, that I have endeavored to convince the public, that the Reviewer believes and maintains opinions which he has unequivocally disclaimed.—But I am utterly unconscious of having given any just occasion for this allegation. I explicitly admitted in my Preface, that he had not formally denied any one doctrine of the Orthodox System; but expressed my conviction, that in his statements and explanations he had adopted principles, which would lead by inevitable consequence, to the denial of important doctrines.—This is the great point which I endeavored to establish; but I have not imputed to him the consequences which I deduced from his system, as a part of his acknowledged creed.

Besides—The statements in his closing number, on which he seems to have relied to allay the fears excited by the preceding

numbers, and to satisfy the public as to his real sentiments, were distinctly brought forward and discussed in my Appendix; so that the reader of the Strictures who has not seen the Review, is in no danger of receiving the false impression anticipated by the Reviewer.

That the Reviewer, in consequence of objections with which he had been pressed, did, in his concluding number, in some respects, vary his statements, appeared to me perfectly evident. But as he retracted nothing which he had previously said, but endeavored to make the impression on the minds of his readers, that he had taken the same ground through the whole discussion; it was perfectly proper to point out the inconsistencies into which he had fallen. This I attempted to do in my Appendix. In his reply, I had reason to expect that he would either reconcile these apparent inconsistencies, or frankly retract. But I cannot find that he has done either. He retracts nothing; but insists that his last statements are "in perfect accordance with the whole tenor of (his) preceding remarks." He will have no cause to complain, therefore, if I persist in bringing different parts of his work together, that the reader may judge as to their perfect accordance.

It was my aim to give a fair and candid representation of the principles laid down in the Review; and to prevent misapprehension, I gave copious extracts. In stating the positions taken by the Reviewer, I rested nothing on my own assertions; but gave his own language, that every reader might be able to judge whether I had misunderstood him. That I have been unfair in my quotations, is not pretended either by himself, or by his coadjutor Evangelus Pacificus. If his language does not teach, what it has been very extensively understood to teach; it is incumbent on him to explain it, and to show what else it can teach. This, however, he has but partially attempted.

It was not without great reluctance that I engaged in this discussion. I am aware that public controversy between brethren who are professedly agreed in their belief of the fundamental doctrines of the gospel, is very undesirable, and ought if possible to be avoided. But I see not how it can be avoided, when individuals publish to the world, and use all their influence to dissemi-

nate opinions, which their brethren honestly believe to be erroneous, and of dangerous tendency. If the apostle Paul thought it necessary, on one occasion, to contend openly with a fellow apostle, it may be necessary even now, that ministers of Christ, for the truth's sake, should sometimes contend openly with brethren whom they have long esteemed and loved, and for whom they still cherish the warmest sentiments of brotherly affection. And unpleasant as religious controversy is in itself, yet if conducted with Christian meekness, it may result in good. The truth will not suffer by candid discussion.

In replying to the Reviewer and Evangelus Pacificus, I have not been influenced by a desire to prolong the controversy, but by the hope and belief that the cause of truth will be promoted by a further discussion. The objections which I have urged against the scheme of the Reviewer, are not to my mind satisfactorily obviated. It still appears to me to involve principles of dangerous tendency—principles tending to sap the foundation of the doctrines of grace :—and although I do not believe that he will ever adopt as his own belief, the consequences to which his principles lead; yet I do seriously fear, that he is preparing the way for the gradual influx of error upon the American churches, disastrous to the interests of evangelical religion. The Reviewer may possibly regard these apprehensions as the fears of weakness and ignorance. If I were the only person who indulged them I would not blame him for so doing. But when he is informed, that many of the most respectable and judicious clergymen in the country, do indulge similar apprehensions; it certainly becomes him to inquire seriously and in the fear of God, whether he is not assuming a tremendous responsibility.

Who the author of the pamphlet signed Evangelus Pacificus is, I know not;—and as he chooses not to be known, I shall take no measures to draw him from his concealment. I would just suggest to him however, that had he styled himself Evangelus Polemicus, it has been thought that his signature would have better corresponded with the character of his work. Had his intentions been really pacific, it was hardly to be expected that he would enlist with such ardour entirely on one side. How much the Reviewer will feel indebted to him for his proffered

aid, I shall not undertake to decide. I will venture however to hazard the conjecture that he will not consider this effort as adding much strength to his cause.

VINDICATION, &c.

THE question at issue, between me and the Reviewer, as was stated in the strictures, is not, whether there are means of regeneration, employed by God, and by his ministers and people; but whether sinners properly speaking ever *use the means of regeneration?*

I stated that "to my mind it was plain, that if sinners use the means of regeneration, they must use them with a holy heart, or an unholy heart, or no heart at all;—i. e. with right motives or wrong motives; or no motive at all. If with right motives, the change is already effected, and the end precedes the means—If with wrong motives, their actions are sinful, and sin is the means of holiness—If with no motive at all, they act without any design, and cannot be using means for the accomplishment of an end." To this the Reviewer replies,

"Now we readily concede, that sinners never use the means of regeneration with a holy heart, nor with an unholy, or sinful heart. But does it therefore follow, that they never use them with any heart *at all?* What is that *heart*, with which God in his law requires sinners to love him? Surely, not a heart which is holy *before* they love him." pp. 5, 6. Very true. But with a heart that is holy *when* they love him. Now we are not inquiring what is the *heart* of the sinner *before* he uses the means of regeneration, but what is his *heart when* he uses them. Will the Reviewer contend that men can love God without holiness? He certainly must, or his illustration is not in point. But he says, "We will venture to say, that this heart consists in those powers and properties of moral agency, which qualify its subject to exercise moral affections." p. 6. Be it so. When with these "powers and properties of moral agency," men love God, do they not perform a holy act? and if with these powers and properties of moral agency, sinners use the means of regeneration, do they not perform a holy or sinful act?

The Reviewer concedes that "Sinners cannot use the means of regeneration, either with right or wrong motives,"

and also, that they "cannot choose with no motive at all." Consequently he contends, that in using the means of regeneration, they are actuated by motives which are neither right nor wrong; and "this" he says "brings us at once to what we consider the turning point in the present discussion; viz: What is a free moral agent—Is he not an agent, who *can* i. e. who has *natural* ability so to use truth as to obey it?" To this I answer most unhesitatingly in the affirmative. "But how?" says the Reviewer. "Not with right or wrong motives, i. e. with good or bad moral intention." Yes, with right motives—with good moral intention, most certainly. If the sinner so uses truth as to obey it, he performs his duty; and surely when a man performs his duty, he acts with good moral intention. But says the Reviewer, "this would imply moral action, *before* moral action." How this follows, the Reviewer has not told us; and until he shall give us some better reason than his simple assertion, I shall still continue to believe, that when a man performs his duty, he always acts with a good moral intention. "It follows therefore (for Dr. Tyler admits the sinner's natural ability to do his duty) that a moral agent can so use the truth as to obey it with motives that are neither right nor wrong." Follows from what? From the Reviewer's assumption, that to suppose the sinner to do his duty with a good moral intention, implies moral action before moral action. But will the Reviewer tell us how a moral agent can do his duty, without a good intention; i. e. without performing a moral act? Does God require any such duty of his creatures?—The Reviewer proceeds,

"We say then, that Dr. Tyler's argument subverts the laws of moral agency, and of course the foundation of human accountability. It rests on a triplet of physical impossibilities. The first is, that a sinner should use the means of regeneration, or conversion, with right i. e. holy motives; which involves this impossibility, that a sinner should be holy *before* he is holy. This of course is a physical impossibility. The second is, that of using these means with sinful motives; which involves another impossibility, viz. that *abusing* these means should be using them; or as Dr. Tyler states it, that "sin should be the means of holiness." This is also a physical impossibility. The third is, that sinners should use these means with no motive at all; which is also a physical impossibility. According to this argument, then, one of these impossible things must take place, or the sinner never can use the means of regeneration."

Be it so. What then? Suppose that my argument does go to prove, by "a triplet of physical impossibilities," that sinners cannot use the means of regeneration; have I subverted the laws of moral agency, and of course the foundation of human accountability? Have I proved that sinners are incapable of doing their

duty? The question is what is their duty? Is it their duty to use the means of regeneration? In what part of the Bible is this duty enjoined? God commands men to be holy, to repent, to believe, to love God, &c. Now suppose that I have proved it to be physically impossible for a man to do his duty, without doing his duty—to be holy without being holy—to repent without repenting—to believe without believing—and to love God without loving him; is this subverting the laws of moral agency? If man is a free moral agent, he is capable of doing his duty; but this does not imply the power of acting without a good or bad moral intention; for to act thus would not be doing his duty. To suppose a man to act voluntarily without good or bad moral intention, is to strip him of the distinguishing characteristics of a moral agent, and to reduce him to the condition of an idiot or a brute.

The Reviewer says "Now if Dr. Tyler will tell us *how* the sinner is able to do his duty, when as he maintains, he cannot do it from right motives, or wrong motives, or no motive at all, he will see the fallacy of his own reasoning." I have not maintained that the sinner cannot do his duty from right motives. I have maintained that he cannot do it without right motives. Now if the Reviewer will tell us, how the sinner can do his duty without right motives, that is, without a good moral intention, in other words, without intending to do his duty; he will see the fallacy of his own reasoning.

"If this be true," says the Reviewer, "it is intuitively certain that no moral being can ever *begin* to act at all, or can ever produce a radical change in his own character. Whence, for example, arose the *first* moral act of Adam? By what impulse was he prompted to his *first* exercise of love to God? Not by a holy motive or intention, for this supposes holiness *before* moral action. As it was impossible for him to act from "no motive at all," it is intuitively certain, on Dr. Tyler's principles, that no such thing as moral action could ever *begin* to exist in man. p. 9.

If this is intuitively true to the mind of the Reviewer, it was not so to the mind of Edwards, whom he is very fond of quoting as authority. In reply to Dr. Taylor, who had said, "that Adam must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection before he was righteous," Edwards says, "with respect to this, I would observe that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things and the common notions of mankind." He says also, "In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly *innocent* as to be perfectly *righteous*. It must be the same, because there can no more be any *medium* between sin and righteousness, or between being right and wrong in a moral

sense, than there can be a medium between being straight and crooked in a natural sense. Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral agent, and therefore he was immediately under a rule of *right* action. He was obliged as soon as he existed, to *act right*. And if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be inclined to act right."* Is it intuitively certain that a moral being cannot act at all, if he must act either right or wrong? To my mind, it is intuitively certain, that if he act at all as a moral being, he must act either right or wrong. If he acts without a good or bad moral intention, he does not act as a moral being. The Reviewer's intuitive truth, therefore, to my mind, is an intuitive absurdity. The Reviewer proceeds—

"How on Dr. Tyler's principles was it possible for Adam *radically* to change his character, and to choose an object which God had interdicted? Not from a sinful motive." p. 10.

Yes, from a sinful motive—with a wrong intention. Surely Adam did not disobey God without intending to disobey; and that was a wicked intention. If it was not, Adam is exonerated from blame. But the Reviewer says, "this supposes sin before the first sin." By no means; for in what did the first sin of Adam consist, if not in acting with a wicked intention? But to return to the point before us, I repeat my argument, and shall view it as conclusive, until some better reasons have been offered to refute it, than any which have yet been adduced by the Reviewer. "If sinners use the means of regeneration, they must use them with a holy heart, or an unholy heart, or no heart at all; that is with right motives, or wrong motives, or no motive at all. If with right motives, the change is already effected, and the end precedes the means—If with wrong motives, their actions are sinful, and sin is the means of holiness—If with no motive at all, they act without any design, and cannot be using means for the accomplishment of an end." I will present the argument in some other forms.

If sinners use the means of regeneration, they either do their duty in using them, or they do not. If they do their duty, they are holy. If they do not do their duty, they neglect it; and to neglect their duty, is sinful.—Again. The means of regeneration are divine truth. When sinners contemplate divine truth, they love it, or hate it, or view it with indifference. If they love it, they are holy.—If they hate it, they are sinful.—If they view it with indifference, they are sinful; for it must be

* Orig. Sin pp. 140, 154.

sinful to regard God's truth with indifference.—Again. When in the light of divine truth, sinners contemplate their sins, they love them or hate them. If they love them, they are sinful—If they hate them, they are holy. When they contemplate the divine character, they love it, or hate it. If they love it, they are holy—If they hate it, they are sinful.—Again. If sinners use the means of regeneration, they use them with a carnal mind, or a spiritual mind. If with the former, they are sinful—If with the latter, they are holy.—Again. If sinners use the means of regeneration, with motives which are neither right nor wrong, it is a matter of indifference whether they use them or not. If they use them, they do not do right; for to do right, is to act with a right intention. But the Reviewer will tell us, that using the means of regeneration, together with the act of giving the heart to God, constitute but one complex moral act. Why then, has he not met the consequences stated in the Appendix to my strictures?

If this series of acts, including the final act of giving the heart to God, constitutes but one moral act, this act has a single, indivisible character. Every moral act, is either sinful or holy. This of course must be a holy act; and the sinner begins to be holy, as soon as he begins to perform it. Consequently, he begins to be holy, before he is born again. But the sinner does not begin to be holy, till his heart is changed. This hypothesis, therefore, involves the absurdity of supposing, that the sinner begins to be holy, before he begins to be holy.

Again—If this entire mental process constitutes but one moral act it is prompted, by one and the same motive. Consequently man antecedent to regeneration, and subsequent to regeneration is actuated by the same motive. The saint and the sinner have the same end in view, and of course possess the same moral character.

Again. It will follow from this hypothesis, that the means of regeneration and the effect of regeneration, are one and the same thing, viz. one single moral act. The Reviewer says,

> "The *truth of* God is the means of regeneration. If the sinner is using that truth *in the act of obeying it*, (and nothing short of this, did we admit to be a using of the means in question) what we ask can he better do? If he is actually performing his duty for the first time, what can be required of him in its place?" p. 3.

Nothing, most surely. He can do nothing better than to do his duty. Now does the Reviewer really believe, that a man can be actually doing his duty, with no good moral intention? Surely, his philosophy must sadly have blinded his eyes.

To prevent misapprehension, I would just remark in this place, that while I maintain that sinners, properly speaking, never use the means of regeneration; I do not mean to affirm, that they are as likely to be saved, while in a state of thoughtless security, as when they are solicitous respecting their future interests. I do not deny, that there are acts of theirs, and states of mind, which do usually precede a change of heart; and which may be regarded as links in the chain of causes and effects by which that event is brought about under the government of God.

Conviction of sin, is an ordinary, and perhaps invariable antecedent of regeneration. This conviction results from a contemplation of divine truth, and a comparison of the heart and life with the rule of duty; and is attended with fear and remorse, with ardent desires to escape future punishment, and with earnest cries to God for mercy. But these desires and feelings are as selfish as any of which the mind of man is ever the subject; and are not unfrequently accompanied with the most dreadful heart-risings against God. There is, however, more probability of the sinner's salvation, while in this state, than there was previous to his conviction;—not because he is less sinful—not because he is doing any thing which God accepts as duty, or to which he has promised his renewing grace; —but because there is evidence that the Divine Spirit is striving with him. This fact, though it affords no certain evidence that he will be converted, creates a hope in those who have been careful to notice God's methods of grace, that he may be a vessel of mercy. When Samuel J. Mills disclosed his feelings to his pious mother on the morning of his conversion, there was nothing surely in the state of his mind, which indicated that *he* was using the means of regeneration; yet there was something, which indicated that *God* was using means with him—something which awakened in her bosom a new degree of hope, while she spread his case before the mercy seat. And what minister of Christ, who has been conversant with religious revivals, has not had his hopes raised in regard to the salvation of particular individuals, at the very moment, that his feelings have been shocked by indications in the same individuals, of dreadful enmity of heart. The sinner is a moral agent, and capable of doing his duty. But he hates his duty, and the more clearly his duty is made known to him, the more he hates it. He is a rebel against God, and loves his rebellion; and every motive by which he is urged to submit, meets with determined resis-

tance from his proud and obstinate will. The light of truth, accompanied by the strivings of the Spirit, may convince him of his guilt and danger; and fill him perhaps with horror inconceivable: but no degree of light is sufficient to subdue the enmity of his heart.

> "The devils know and tremble too,
> But devils (do) not love."

And all the light of the last day, will not subdue the obduracy of the sinner's heart. If the carnal mind is enmity against God, as the scriptures declare, then the more clearly the *true* character of God is apprehended by unrenewed men, the more will the enmity of their hearts be called into exercise. So far, therefore, are sinners from using, in any proper manner, the means of regeneration, that they constantly resist and abuse the means which God is using to reclaim them. They *hate the light*, and *do always resist the Holy Ghost.*

I observed in the Strictures, that I was not altogether satisfied with the meaning which the Reviewer attaches to the term regeneration, when used in what he calls the "restricted or theological sense." He uses it to denote "that act of the will or heart which consists in a preference of God to every other object; making it of course an act of the sinner, and not at all distinguishable from the first act of repentance, or faith, or love, or submission, or whatever may be the first moral act of the new born soul. That the term has sometimes been thus used by theologians, by a figure of speech, which puts the effect for the cause, I did not deny. It may have been used in this sense more frequently than I had supposed.* It was however my opinion, that in its literal siguification, it denotes exclusively the act of God in renewing the heart, and that this is the sense in which it is used in the Scriptures. I asked, "who would feel authorized to say that the sinner rdgenerates himself?" To this the Reviewer replies,

> "We think, no one; and the reason is. not that the word is used to denote exclusively the act of God, but to denote a change in man under this peculiar relation, that it is "produced by the Holy Spirit." p. 11.

The same may be said of the first act of repentance, faith, love, or submission, and yet we deem it proper to say, that the sinner repents, believes, loves God, &c. and if these terms and

* That the distinction between regeneration and conversion, was not introduced by Dr. Hopkins as the Reviewer intimates, is certain; for Dr. Bellamy says, "It is usual for divines to distinguish between regeneration and conversion."

regeneration, are synonimous, why is it not equally proper to say, that the sinner regenerates himself? But I shall not dwell on this point at present; because I do not consider it essential to my main design. In speaking of regeneration, therefore, in the subsequent discussion, I shall conform to the usage of the Reviewer.

I observed in the Strictures, that I was not satisfied with the distinction made by the Reviewer, between what he calls the popular and theological use of the term regeneration. In reply, he insists that I have made the same distinction, and admitted "in the fullest manner, the comprehensive import of the term in question." But this is far from being the fact. I have said, that the first moral act of the new born soul is an intelligent act, and consequently includes the perception of the intellect, as well as the act of the will or heart. But I added, it does not suppose a succession or series of mental acts; nor is it a complex act, in any other sense, than is every voluntary act of the mind. Now the Reviewer, certainly could not understand me to include in this act, antecedent voluntary acts; for if every voluntary act, includes antecedent voluntary acts, there must be an act of the will, before the first act of the will. I used the term in the same sense as I understood the Reviewer to use it, when speaking of regeneration in the restricted or theological sense. In this sense, he informs us, it denotes "that act of the will or heart, which consists in a preference of God to every other object." And is not this an intelligent act? Can an object be preferred, which is not perceived? Besides—This is what he denominates the theological sense. And does he suppose that any theologian has spoken of acts of the will without supposing them to be intelligent acts? Does he suppose that Dr. Griffin, Dr. Hopkins, and Dr. Strong, to whom he refers, use language in this manner? When, for instance, Dr. Strong says, "*Choosing* a truth or object, is *loving* it, *rejecting*, is *hating* it," does he speak of choosing, loving, rejecting, and hating, without perception? I may have erred in calling the first moral act of the new born soul a complex act; but I supposed that I had sufficiently guarded my meaning, when I said, that by this I meant only, that it included a perception of the understanding, as well as the act of the will or heart; and when I said, it was not a complex act in any other sense, than is every other voluntary act of the mind.

But regeneration in its comprehensive sense, according to the Reviewer, denotes "several particular acts and states of mind, or a series of such acts and states." It includes all those

acts which constitute using the means of regeneration. And what are those acts? The Reviewer has told us.

"Before the act of the will or heart in which the sinner first prefers God to every other object, the object of the preference must be viewed or estimated as the greatest good. Before the object can be viewed as the greatest good, it must be compared with other objects, as both are sources or means of good. Before this act of comparing, there must be an act dictated not by selfishness, but by *self-love*, in which the mind determines to direct its thoughts to the objects for the sake of considering their relative value, of forming a judgment respecting it, and of choosing one or the other as the chief good. These acts also imply under the presentation of the objects to the mind, an intellectual perception of their adaptedness to the nature of man as sources or means of happiness; and also an excitement of constitutional susceptibilities in view of the objects, i. e. involuntary propensities, inclinations, or desires, toward each object respectively." pp. 19, 20.

Again:

"Let the sinner then, as a being who loves happiness and desires the highest degree of it. under the influence of such a desire, take into solemn consideration the question whether the highest happiness is to be found in God or in the world; let him pursue this inquiry, if need be, till it result in the conviction that such happiness is to be found in God only;—and let him follow up this conviction with that intent and engrossing contemplation of the realities which truth discloses, and with that stirring up of his sensibilities in view of them, which shall invest the world, when considered as his only portion, with an aspect of insignificance, of gloom and even of terror. and which shall chill and suspend his present active love of it; and let the contemplation be persevered in, till it shall discover a reality and an excellence in the objects of holy affection, which shall put him upon direct and desperate efforts to fix his heart upon them; and let this process of thought, of effort, and of action, be entered upon as one which is never to be abandoned, until the end proposed by it is accomplished,—until the only living and true God is loved and chosen, as his God forever; and we say, that in this way the work of his regeneration, through grace, *may* be accomplished." pp. 32, 33.

This he tells us, is "substantially the actual process in every instance of regeneration." Regeneration in its comprehensive sense, according to the Reviewer, commences when using the means of regeneration commences; and this commences when the sinner begins solemnly to consider.

"Here," says the Reviewer, "the mental process of using the means of regeneration either begins, or does not begin. If he thus considers, it begins; and now the appropriate tendency of consideration is to deepen emotion; and thus by the mutual influence of thought and feeling, the tendency of the mind to that entire mental process which we have described. and the tendency of the process to a change of heart, become undeniable and conspicuous in human consciousness." p. 227.

The reader is now prepared to judge whether I have admitted in the fullest manner, the comprehensive import of the term regeneration.

To justify this distinction, the Review appeals again to scriptural authority.

"'I thought on my ways, and turned my feet to thy testimonies.' We ask if the act or acts of *thought*, are not here distinguished from the act of *turning* to the divine testimonies? But says Dr. Tyler, a sinner "may think on his ways with self-loathing and godly sorrow." Be it so. But can the sinner feel godly sorrow, without first, in the order of nature, thinking on his ways?" p. 14.

I might here turn the Reviewer over to his coadjutor, E. P., and remind him that "action when predicated of Spirit generally—may be something different from action, when predicated of matter, not subject to the same laws of sequence." But not to insist on this: I still say, as I said before, that every sinner either loves or hates his sins. Between these two states of mind, there is no medium. The sinner may think of his ways, and perceive their sinfulness, and still be unwilling to relinquish them. Now while *thus* thinking of his ways, will the Reviewer contend that he has begun to be regenerated? while he sees his sins and loves them—while he contemplates divine truth, and hates it; has his regeneration commenced? But suppose he should begin to hate his sins, or to love the truth. Does this necessarily imply any antecedent voluntary acts that are not sinful?

According to the Reviewer's theory, the sinner ceases to love his sins, and then begins to deliberate whether he shall not hate them. He takes into consideration the question whether more happiness is to be enjoyed in hating, than in loving sin. He pursues this inquiry till it produces conviction. He follows up this conviction with intent and engrossing contemplation. He perseveres in this contemplation, till he has such a sense of the importance of hating his sins, as puts him upon direct and desperate efforts to hate them. Now I maintain, that the sinner loves his sins, *till* he hates them. The one affection is expelled by the introduction of the other, according to Dr. Chalmers' theory of "the expulsive power of a new affection."

I stated in the Strictures, that the Reviewer, as it appeared to me, had fallen into a mistake as to the nature of selfishness. According to him, selfishness consists in the supreme love of the world, or in preferring the world to God, as our portion or chief good. But in the term *world*, he tells us, he means to include "all that from which a man is capable of deriving happiness, and which can come in competition as an object of affection with his Maker." But does the Reviewer mean to admit, that selfishness is the supreme love of self?—that "it consists in a preference of *ourselves* to others—to all others;

to the universe and to God?" Does he mean to admit, that if a man regards himself more than God, and his own interest and happiness, more than the good of all the universe beside, he is necessarily selfish? Certainly not, unless I misunderstand him; for he contends, that a moral being may be destitute of benevolence and actuated by self-love, and still not be selfish. But as I said in the Strictures, if such a being love himself at all, he must love himself supremely. What other object does he regard more than self? Not God, nor the happiness of the universe. What other object does he regard at all? Nothing, except as it tends to promote his ultimate end, viz. his own happiness. This fills all his eye, and engrosses all his thoughts, and all his purposes. To this he is supremely devoted. Consequently he is supremely selfish. It is impossible to conceive of a being more so. But according to the Reviewer, selfishness does not consist in a supreme regard to self, but in a preference of the world to God, or of "a limited" to "a general good." Why then call it selfishness? The Reviewer has attempted to answer this question. He says, "Because he who loves supremely an inferior or limited object, does it to the exclusion of a greater good." This may be a reason why he should be called worldly, but it is no reason why he should be called selfish. The Reviewer proceeds: "He arrays his happiness as found in that limited object, against the happiness of the universe." No; he arrays his happiness as found in that object, against his happiness as found in another object. In both cases, according to the Reviewer's theory, *his* happiness is his ultimate end. "He magnifies self at the expense of every other interest." No; he does not magnify *self* at all. He only magnifies the *world*. *Self*, according to the Reviewer's theory, is as much regarded by the holy being, as by the sinful being. *Self-love* is "the master spring of human action." "Of all specific voluntary action, the happiness of the agent, in some form, is the ultimate end." *Self* then is the grand object of regard. It is exalted above God, and all the universe must pay it homage. Nothing is to be loved or regarded, but as a means of ministering to self-gratification. Why then call the love of the world, selfishness, and the love of God, benevolence? The Reviewer's reasons are, to my mind, by no means satisfactory.

But let us attend a moment to E. P.'s notions of selfishness. "Accurate discrimination" he tells us, "is here essential—No man is both the agent and object of his own affections. No man

loves himself." This surely is new philosophy and new theology—a philosophy and a theology with which the Apostle seems to have been unacquainted. "*In the last days, perilous times shall come, for men shall be lovers of their own selves.*'

But if no man loves himself, what is *self-love?* "Self-love," says E. P., "if the term be used with philosophical accuracy, designates an instinctive desire of happiness, or desire to be happy." But suppose that I desire my neighbour to be happy; do I love my neighbour? If when I desire my own happiness, I do not love myself, how can I be said to love my neighbour, when I desire his happiness? *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.* Does not this precept require me to love myself, as well as my neighbour? Besides—If no man loves himself, why call this desire of happiness self-love?

But what is selfishness? In answer to this question, E. P. quotes from the Reviewer—

"Every man, considered as an accountable subject of God's moral government, has some object of supreme regard, and this may be said to be either God or the world. He who loves the world supremely, will act for the world, that he may obtain worldly good, and he who loves God supremely, will act for God, that he may glorify and enjoy him forever." It were difficult to conceive how a statement could be made, at once more strictly philosophical and scriptural than this" p. 14.

Selfishness then, according to him, is the supreme love of the world, and is manifested in the pursuit of worldly good. That this is one way in which selfishness is manifested, is undoubtedly true. But suppose that a person has such an engrossing sense of the vanity of the world, and the realities of eternity, that he goes about to establish his own righteousness; suppose that he bestows all his goods to feed the poor, and gives his body to be burned, for the sake of purchasing eternal life; is he not selfish? But what worldly good is he seeking? Or suppose that he immures himself in a dungeon, denies himself every worldly comfort, and inflicts upon himself every conceivable torture, to atone for his sins;—Is he not selfish? But what worldly good is he seeking?

If the Reviewer and his coadjutor, should appear again before the public, they are desired to give a definite answer to the following question. Is not the moral being who regards his own happiness more than the glory of God, and the happiness of the Universe, a selfish being?

"We come now," says the Reviewer, "to the turning point of the whole discussion; we mean the distinction between *self-love* and *selfishness*." p. 15

The reader will recollect, that on p. 6, the turning point in the present discussion, was, "What is a free moral agent?" In my apprehension, however, we have not yet come to the turning point. I have no dispute with the Reviewer as to what constitutes a free moral agent; nor have I any dispute with him in regard to the distinction between self-love and selfishness. Although both he and his coadjutor charge me with denying this distinction, I have expressly admitted it. I have said, that in holy beings, self-love is a subordinate principle, and is under the control of universal benevolence. But in moral beings, destitute of benevolence, self-love becomes the controlling principle; and is then the same as selfishness. I know not how to express my ideas on this point, better than by quoting the following remarks of Edwards:

"When God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an *inferior* kind, which may be called *natural*, being the principles of mere human nature; such as *self-love*, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honour and pleasure, were exercised: These when alone, and left to themselves, are what the scriptures sometimes call flesh. Besides these there were *superior* principles, that were spiritual, holy and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness.—When man sinned, and broke God's covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart—The inferior principles of *self-love*, and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone and left to themselves, *of course* became *reigning* principles; having no superior principles to regulate and control them, they became absolute masters of the heart." Orig. Sin. pp. 317—319.

Is it now asked, what is selfishness? I answer; According to the theory of Edwards, it is *self-love* reigning in the unsanctified heart, with no superior principle to regulate and control it. If a man destitute of benevolence, loves himself at all, he loves himself supremely; and is consequently supremely selfish. *Self-love*, which, as Edwards says, "was given only to serve," has now become "the *reigning* principle."

I have no where denied that "self-love, or the desire of happiness, is an essential attribute of moral beings;" nor have I maintained as the Reviewer has repeatedly represented, that every degree of self-love is selfish and sinful. I fully believe, that it is the duty of every man to love himself, as well as his neighbour. This is enjoined in the divine law, and is implied in the exercise of disinterested love. Every man's self makes a part of the universal whole; and if he loves the whole, he will necessarily love himself as a part of the whole. I accord perfectly with representations given of this subject, by Dr. Hop-

kins and Dr. Dwight, as quoted by the Reviewer. All for which I contend, is, that if a man loves himself more than God, and all the Universe beside, he is selfish and sinful. I believe with Dr. Dwight, that "selfishness is the preference of ourselves to others, to all others, to the Universe and to God." I also fully admit the principle laid down by Edwards, "If nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing." And if this is all which the Reviewer means, when he says, that "self-love is the primary cause of moral action," and that "of all specific voluntary action, the happiness of the agent in some form is the ultimate end;" as he seems occasionally to intimate, I have no dispute with him. Still I must think that he has used language, very unfortunately, and in a manner directly calculated to mislead his readers. If a man makes his happiness his ultimate end, as I have been in the habit of understanding language, he makes self the object of supreme regard. But the Reviewer says:

"The term "ultimate end," we know, has been often employed to express the *object*, as wealth, power, the glory of God, etc. in which happiness is found. But it is obvious from the whole tenor of our remarks, in the passages referred to by Dr. Tyler, (pp. 19—22,) that we were not speaking of any object *external* to the mind. It was a "*desire*" of the soul, we were considering." p. 18.

I did not understand the Reviewer to mean any object external to the mind. I understood him to speak of the "*desire* of the soul,"—the internal motive by which man is influenced. Why does the worldling seek wealth or honor? To promote his own happiness. Why does the Christian seek the good of his fellow men? According to the Reviewer, for precisely the same reason; to promote his own happiness. I see not then, but the motive, in both cases, is precisely the same. Both have the same *ultimate end* in view. They are engaged in different pursuits, it is true; but they have the same aim—are prompted by the same desire, and are influenced by the same motive. In both cases, *self* is the ultimate object of regard. I see not, therefore, that there can be any radical distinction of moral character between them. But says the Reviewer,

"Is there 'no radical distinction,' then, between the seraph who *chooses* the service of God, and the apostate who *chooses* to rebel against him, because they both *aim* at happiness, in the choice they make? In that CHOICE of different objects, lies 'the radical distinction.'" p. 18.

And is it so? Is it the "*choice of different objects*" merely, which constitutes the distinction of moral character? Suppose

that two individuals choose the same object from different motives; e. g. Suppose one man chooses to be honest and upright in his conduct, from a regard to his interest and happiness in the world; and another chooses to be honest and upright, from a regard to the glory of God. Is here no distinction of moral character? Again. Suppose two individuals to choose different objects, from the same motive. Owing to different states of society in which they are placed, one finds that it will promote his interest and reputation to disregard the Sabbath—the other finds that it will promote his interest and reputation, to pay an outward respect to this divine institution. They regulate their conduct accordingly. Now does this choice of different objects, prompted by the same motive, constitute any radical distinction of moral character? I have always supposed that moral actions derived their character from the nature of the motives by which they are prompted. If this be so, and if it be a fact, that all moral beings have the same ultimate end in view, (i. e.) if they are actuated by the same motives, (for such it appears to me must be the meaning of this language, if it mean any thing,) then all radical distinction between holiness and sin is annihilated.

I said in the Strictures, "Now if a person's own happiness is the ultimate end of pursuit,—he is influenced by the selfish principle; and if this is the ultimate end of all moral beings, as the Reviewer contends, I see not but every moral being in the Universe, is supremely selfish." The Reviewer quotes this sentence, and immediately subjoins,

"" As the *reviewer* contends?" No. *As* Dr. Tyler alters our statement, by inserting a word which arrays "the *happiness* of the agent" (the reviewer's expression) in opposition to the happiness of others, and thus *changes* self-love into selfishness When we said that happiness is the ultimate end of the agent, in all specific voluntary actions, we stated only what Dr. Dwight has laid down with much greater force." pp. 17, 18.

Now the passage here referred to, is the following: "Of all specific voluntary action, the HAPPINESS OF THE AGENT in some form is the *ultimate end.*" The reader can judge whether I have altered his statement; or whether he has not altered his own statement. If this language does not mean, that in every voluntary act, the agent makes his *own happiness* his ultimate end, it is certainly beyond my power to divine what it can mean.

But what is the motive in benevolent action? A regard to the glory of God and the general good. But does not the good man find his happiness in doing good? Undoubtedly. But it

is one thing to find his happiness, and another to seek it as his ultimate end. It is one thing to be happy in doing good, and another to do good solely for the sake of being happy. The good man would delight to do good at the expense of some portion of his personal happiness. But did not Moses have respect to the recompense of reward? Certainly. And it is the duty of every man to desire and to seek his own salvation, as well as that of his fellow men; but it is not his duty to regard himself more than God and all the Universe beside. But is not the will as the greatest apparent good? Does not every act of choice imply that the object chosen appears agreeable, pleasant or grateful to the mind? Undoubtedly. But this does not imply, that every moral being makes his happiness his ultimate end. Suppose that a benevolent being were to know that by sacrificing some portion of his personal happiness, a vast amount of good might be secured. Would he not choose to make the sacrifice? Would it not be more agreeable to him, more congenial with his feelings, to suffer this loss of personal happiness, than that this amount of good should fail? Is not this the very nature of benevolence? Does it not imply a willingness to make personal sacrifices for the sake of a greater good? But what is the motive in this case? Not the individual's personal happiness; for the very thing chosen, is the sacrifice of personal happiness. If the Reviewer will test his principles by a case of this kind, he will at once see the fallacy of his reasoning. The Reviewer says,

"Thus we say wealth is the motive of one, honor of another, etc. But do we mean by this, that he who chooses wealth, or honor, proposes no happiness to himself? Is it not true, that the *enjoyment* connected with wealth or honor, is the real "ultimate end" which is regarded in the choice? If not, why choose wealth or honor at all? So, the happiness of others is the *objective* motive to a benevolent choice. But who can doubt, that he who chooses the happiness of others, does so for the happinesss he expects in seeing others happy?" p. 21.

According to this statement, a man chooses the happiness of others, for precisely the same reason, that he chooses wealth or honor; not because he regards it as a good in itself, but because it ministers to his own gratification. If no personal benefit were to accrue to him from the happiness of others, he would not regard it as at all desirable. Is this the nature of benevolence? On the contrary, does not the benevolent being regard the happiness of others as good and desirable in itself, aside from all considerations of personal interest? If happiness is a good to him, it is a good to others; and if he loves his neighbor as himself, he regards the happiness of his neigh-

bor as he regards his own; and for the same reason that he regards his own, because it is a good in itself. And he does no more desire his neighbor's happiness for the sake of promoting his own, than he desires his own happiness for the sake of promoting his neighbor's.

"But," says the Reviewer, "can there be a motive, without some *good*—either enjoyment or exemption from suffering—expected and sought by the agent who wills or chooses?" p. 21.

Yes, the good of others may be a motive; and not merely in the sense in which wealth and honor are motives; but a *regard* to the happiness of others as *a good in itself*, may be "the internal principle or feeling which prompts us to seek" their happiness. And such is the fact in regard to benevolent action. To suppose the contrary, is to suppose that every moral being makes *himself* the *primary* object of regard, and that he sees nothing *desirable* in the glory of God, or the happiness of the universe, only as they are *subservient* to his personal interests. This surely is to set up SELF above Jehovah, and to make it our God; and if this is not selfishness, and the very root of human depravity, I know not what can deserve the name. Says the Reviewer,

"What shall we say, of all the servants of the Most High, who, like Moses, have "had respect unto the *recompense* of reward;" if man, as a "MORAL AGENT," cannot desire happiness without being selfish and sinful? For this is the true question." p. 22.

In my apprehension, this is far from being the true question. I have never maintained that "man as a moral agent cannot desire happiness without being selfish and sinful." On the contrary I maintain that it is the duty of every man to desire and seek his own happiness; but not as his ultimate end. It is only when he prefers himself to others, to all others, to the universe and to God," that he is selfish and sinful. The Reviewer proceeds:

"Dr. Tyler, we know, has *applied* his principle, only to "unrenewed men." But, if true at all, its application does not stop there. Man, *as* man, on Dr. Tyler's principle, is necessarily selfish in desiring happiness." p. 22.

This does not follow, except on the assumption, that "man as man" does necessarily love himself more than God and all the universe beside.

The following questions were proposed in the Strictures:

"If this theory be correct, I would seriously inquire, whether all which is necessary to insure the regeneration of a sinner, is not a conviction of the understanding, that he has mistaken

the true way of securing his highest happiness? So soon as he shall be convinced that a greater degree of happiness is to be derived from God, than from the world, will not self-love immediately prompt him to change the object of his preference? Does not his depravity consist entirely in ignorance—in a mistake of judgment? And will not light infallibly correct this mistake, and ensure his conversion to God? I propose these questions for the solemn consideration of the Reviewer." In reply to these questions, he says,

"We did not expect to be charged, in a tone of such imposing solemnity, with maintaining principles diametrically contrary to the whole tenor of our reasoning." p. 24.

The foregoing questions were suggested by the statements of the Reviewer, among which is the following:

"The answer which human consciousness gives, is, that the being constituted with a capacity for happiness desires to be happy; and knowing that he is capable of deriving happiness from different objects, considers from which the greatest happiness may be derived, and as in this respect he judges or estimates their relative value, so he chooses or prefers the one or the other as his chief good. While this must be the process by which a moral being forms his first moral preference, substantially the same process is indispensable to *a change* of this preference. p. 21.

The reader can judge whether my questions were authorized by the Reviewer's language. It will be perceived, that his statement is unqualified: "As in this respect he *judges*, or estimates their relative value, *so he chooses*." If this is true, without qualification, as it is here stated, (and many other similar passages might be adduced,) the conclusions involved in the foregoing questions, are inevitable. This the Reviewer cannot deny. But if he did not mean to be so understood, if he only meant, as he now affirms, that man chooses, what appears to him at the time "most agreeable," although it may be "in opposition to (his) better judgment," why did he not so qualify his language? He ought not surely to complain of his readers for understanding him to say, what he actually did say. "These questions" says the Reviewer, "would not have been put, if Dr. Tyler had entered more fully into Edwards' views of moral agency." To this, I have only to say, that I was not altogether unacquainted with Edwards' views, and that had the Reviewer expressed himself as Edwards has done, my questions would not have been put.

We come now to what I deem the turning point of the whole discussion, viz: whether the selfish principle is suspended in the sinner's heart, antecedent to regeneration? The Reviewer says,

"We cannot but regret, that Dr. Tyler did not meet us on the real point at issue. He denied the possibility of any using of the means of regeneration, on the part of sinners. It became him, therefore, to show, (in opposition to our arguments,) that it is possible, in the nature of things, for the mind to pass from the supreme love of the world, to the supreme love of God, without any of those intervening mental acts, which involve the suspension of the selfish principle. It became him to show, that one object (as God) can become to the mind the greatest apparent good, and be actually chosen; while, in the strictest cotemporaneousness, another object (as the world) is likewise viewed as the greatest apparent good, and is actually chosen also. It became him to show, (for he denies any intervening suspension in the case,) that selfishness and benevolence are, in the strictest sense, co-existing states of mind in the renewed sinner—that, from three absolute impossibilities, selfishness neither does nor can cease from the mind, even in the order of nature, before holy love takes possession of the soul. This, we say, is the real point at issue." p. 27.

This, however, is. not the real point at issue. It is not whether selfishness and benevolence, are in thestrictest sense co-existing atates of mind in the renewed sinner—but whether the last sinful act is *immediately* followed by the first holy act; or whether there are intervening voluntary acts—a series of acts and states of mind which are neither sinful nor holy? It is, whether, after the sinner has ceased to act from wrong motives, he uses the means of regeneration with motives which are neither right nor wrong? The Reviewer knows, that no man ever maintained that hatred and love, selfishness and benevolence, are in the strictest sense, co-existing states of mind. The question is, whether the transition from the one state to the other is not *immediate.*

If he maintains that this is impossible, it certainly becomes him to show, that it is possible that it should be otherwise—that is, that moral action should stop, or be suspended, in a moral agent in the full possession of his powers, and with his obligations full in his view. If the sinner ceases to sin, and begins to act from motives that are neither right nor wrong, most certainly moral action is suspended.

"Nor is it possible, that while one object *continues* to be chosen as the supreme good, the opposite object should also be chosen, by a *co-existing* act, as the supreme good. To renounce the selfish principle is therefore one thing,—to choose Good as our portion is another. Otherwise the man would both choose and not choose—would be both selfish and benevolent—totally depraved and yet holy, in the same act. He would in the strictest sense, "be divided against himself,—an absurdity, we still think, sufficiently palpable to silence even Jewish caviling." p. 29.

This reasoning is fallacious, as any one will see who looks at it with attention. The second sentence in this paragraph, is supposed to be an inference from the first; but it is not a log-

ical inference. To be supremely selfish, is one thing; and to choose God as our portion, is another. But to choose God as our portion, is the renunciation of the selfish principle. And if a man ceases to be selfish, by becoming benevolent, (the only way in which he can do it, without ceasing to act as a moral agent,) does he both choose, and not choose—is he both selfish and benevolent in the same act? What is that act by which a man renounces selfishness, if it is not a benevolent act? Is it not a good thing to renounce selfishness? And when a man renounces his selfishness, does he not do a good thing? Does he not act with a good moral intention? But according to the Reviewer's theory, a man renounces his selfishness without any good intention. He then deliberates without any good intention, whether he shall resume it, or become benevolent. He takes into solemn consideration the question, whether more happiness is to be derived from benevolence than from selfishness—He pursues this inquiry till it results in conviction —He follows up this conviction with engrossing contemplation—He perseveres in this contemplation till he is constrained to make direct and desperate efforts to become benevolent. And all this he does without any good intention. If this is the way in which a selfish being becomes benevolent (and such, the Reviewer tells us, is substantially the actual process in every instance of regeneration,) it is truly one thing to renounce the selfish principle, and another to become holy. The Reviewer appeals to Scripture to justify his distinction. He says,

"There is such a thing as 'ceasing to do evil,' in distinction from 'learning to do well.' Isa. i. 16, 17. There is a 'casting away all your transgressions,' in distinction from 'making a new heart, and a new spirit.' Ezek. xviii 31. There is a 'taking away the heart of stone,' in distinction from 'giving the heart of flesh.' Ezek. xxxvi. 26. p. 30.

But I would ask if ceasing to do evil and learning to do well, is not one and the same thing? How does the sinner cease to do evil, if not by learning to do well? What is it to make a new heart and new spirit, if not to cast away our transgressions, or to renounce our sins? Does a man renounce his sins with no good intention? If not, then the renunciation of sin, implies the exercise of a new heart. And what is taking away the heart of stone, if it is not giving a heart of flesh? What is the heart, which is neither a heart of stone, nor a heart of flesh?—in other words, a hard heart, or a broken heart—a selfish heart, or a benevolent heart—a proud heart, or a contrite heart—an evil heart, or a good heart—an impenitent heart, or a penitent

heart? Will the Reviewer tell us, what the state of the sinner's heart is, while he is using the means of regeneration, with an intention that is neither right nor wrong? The Reviewer proceeds:

"There is a 'not loving the world, neither the things that are in the world, in distinction from the 'love of the Father;' nor can the love of the one strictly coexist with the love of the other." p. 30.

Whoever supposed that the love of the one can strictly coexist with the love of the other? If the sinner ceases to love the world, by beginning to love God, does this imply any such co-existence?

"There is a 'putting off the old man' in distinction from 'putting on the new man.'" p. 30.

But I ask, if putting off the old man is not putting on the new man? What is the sinner when he has put off the old man? Is he not a new creature? Or has he ceased to exist? But does not the Apostle make a distinction between putting off the old man, and putting on the new? I answer, the sacred writers often repeat in this manner the same idea under different forms of expression. For example, *Make you a new heart, and a new spirit.* What is the difference between a new heart and a new spirit? A multitude of similar examples might be adduced.*

"In this sense therefore, Dr. Tyler's question is, whether two distinct acts are still the same—whether to cease is the same as to begin." p. 30.

And does the Reviewer really suppose that ceasing to act, is acting? Suppose I should say, the sinner ceases to hate, by beginning to love; do I make two distinct acts, one and the same? Certainly not; for there is but one act in the case.—Suppose the act of love immediately to succeed the act of hatred. How does the sinner cease to hate? Not in hating surely. To hate, and to cease to hate, are not the same. He ceases to hate, therefore, by beginning to love. Consequently, "to cease, is the same as to begin." The sinner ceases to be sinful, by beginning to be holy—He ceases to be dead, by beginning to live—He ceases to be blind, by beginning to see—He ceases to be a natural man, by beginning to be a spiritual man—He ceases to be proud, by beginning to be humble—

* These expressions, "are Hebrew parallelisms, and not philosophical distinctions."

He ceases to be selfish, by beginning to be benevolent—He ceases to be an enemy, by beginning to be a friend—He ceases to be against Christ, by beginning to be for him—he ceases to do evil, by beginning to do well—He ceases to be impenitent, by beginning to repent—He ceases to be a rebel, by beginning to submit—He ceases to love the world, by beginning to love God—He puts off the old man, by putting on the new man—And makes him a new heart, and a new spirit, by renouncing his sins.

Further—Suppose it should be admitted, that the expressions, "cease to do evil and learn to do well"—"put off the old man and put on the new man" denote separate acts, does it follow that either of them is antecedent to a change of heart? Sinners are commanded to repent and be converted; and does this imply that repentance is antecedent to a change of heart? I would ask the Reviewer, whether the sinner ceases to do evil, and puts off the old man, with no good intention? If not, then he does not cease to do evil, and put off the old man, antecedent to a change of heart.

Again. I would ask the Reviewer, whether God ever takes away the heart of stone, without giving the heart of flesh?—and whether the sinner ever puts off the old man, without putting on the new? If he says no; I would ask, if the sinner's use of means, is not infallibly connected with his regeneration? But he says, "the intervention of the Holy Spirit is in no instance pledged to any act of theirs—there is at best but a peradventure that God will give them repentance." There is then at best but a peradventure, that after God has taken away the heart of stone, he will ever give a heart of flesh—and after the sinner has put off the old man, there is at best, but a peradventure that he will ever put on the new man.

But I proceed to consider the manner in which the Reviewer supposes the selfish principle to be suspended.* He says,

*"But says Dr. Tyler, 'How is the selfish principle suspended?' On this point the Reviewer has given us no information.' We confess, that we hardly know what to say in respect to this assertion. We stated so explicitly, and in so many forms, that the suspension of the selfish principle is to be traced (under God) to *self-love* or the desire of happiness, as appealed to by divine truth, that we must leave it with Dr. Tyler to explain his peremptory denial of this plain matter of fact." pp. 34, 35. All the explanation that I have to give on this point, is, that I did seek diligently for the information needed, but could not find it; and if the Reviewer has given this information so explicitly, and so frequently as he here intimates, it is a little remarkable that he should not have quoted, at least, one of these explicit passages, that the reader might see how inexcusable I was in overlooking it.

"Divine truth, urged home upon the soul by the Holy Spirit, may appeal so strongly to the sinner's sense of danger and desire of happiness, as to suspend the control of the selfish principle *in this act of fixed attention to his real interest.*" pp. 30, 31. This act of fixed attention, he tells us, in a subsequent paragragh, is "prompted by a regard to happiness;" that is, not by selfishness, but by self-love. But I would ask, when the sinner resolved to attend to his real interests, was he supremely selfish, or was he not? If he was, this act was a selfish act; for the Reviewer, himself says, "There is no law of human action, more obvious, or more universally admitted in the intercourse of life, than that a man's supreme affection or governing purpose while active in the mind, will *dictate* and *control* all his specific voluntary acts." p. 23. And who will affirm that any act of the mind dictated by selfishness has a tendency to suspend selfishness? The Reviewer says, "We think no one." But if the sinner was not supremely selfish when he *resolved* to attend to his real interests, then, according to the Reviewer's philosophy, the selfish principle was suspended antecedent to this "act of voluntary attention:"—and the question returns, how was it suspended? "To renounce the selfish principle," the Reviewer tells us, "is one thing—to choose God as our portion, is another." He also tells us, "that before the act of the will or heart, in which the sinner first prefers God to every other object, the object of the preference must be viewed or estimated as the greatest good. Before the object can be viewed as the greatest good, it must be compared with other objects, as both are sources or means of good. Before this act of comparing, there must be an act, dictated not by *selfishness* but by *self-love*, in which the mind determines to direct its thoughts to the objects, for the sake of considering their relative value, of forming a judgment respecting it, and of choosing one or the other as the chief good." Now apply this reasoning to the renunciation of the selfish principle. 'Before the act in which the selfish principle is renounced, this object must be viewed or estimated as the greatest good. Before it can be thus viewed, there must be an act of comparing —Before this act of comparing, there must be an act in which the mind determines to direct its thoughts to the subject;—an act dictated not by *selfishness*, but by *self-love*. But here we are in difficulty. The selfish principle is not yet suspended; and of course continues to "*dictate* and *control* all (the) spe-

cific voluntary acts." Instead of meeting and obviating this difficulty, the Reviewer attempts to evade it, by fastening the same upon me. He says,

"As to the fact of such a suspension of the selfish principle, we may turn Dr. Tyler's question on himself. Since man cannot "from a selfish motive" "resolve not to be selfish," how can he "from a selfish motive" begin to love God or actually do so?" p. 31.

I answer, he cannot. No one ever supposed that he could. What then? Why, says the Reviewer,

"If the selfish principle then is not first suspended in some way, it is impossible for him, in the nature of things, ever to love God." p. 31.

This is "applying his own philosophy to another man's theology," and subjects him to the rebuke of his coadjutor, Evangelus Pacificus. It is no part of my philosophy, that one voluntary act necessarily involves antecedent voluntary acts, for this would imply that there must be an act of the will, before the first act of the will. I maintain that the sinner ceases to be supremely selfish, by beginning to love God. If the Reviewer insists that this is impossible in the nature of things—that the act of choosing God as our portion, must be preceded by voluntary acts that are not selfish; let him tell how the selfish principle can be suspended, unless the act in which it is suspended, is preceded by voluntary acts that are not selfish. Is there any more difficulty in supposing that the sinner ceases to act wrong, by beginning to act right, than there is in supposing that he ceases to act wrong, by beginning to act neither right nor wrong? i. e. without either a good or bad moral intention? Why not say, that the word of God, urged home upon the soul by the Holy Spirit, *dethrones* the selfish principle, in the *very act of loving God?* But this according to the Reviewer is "impossible in the nature of things;" and yet he is obliged to surmount this impossibility, to account for the suspension of the selfish principle.

But let us see if E. P. has helped the Reviewer out of this difficulty. He says,

"Let the reader pause, and think, and go carefully along here. In the soul of a regenerate person, are self-love, and a holy principle. In the soul of an unregenerate person, are self-love and a selfish principle. Now this selfish principle cannot dictate a holy act. It cannot cast out itself. "Can satan cast out satan?" But the sinner is a moral agent. He has natural ability to become holy. There *is* then something in the human soul, which *can* dictate a holy act. It is something to which no moral quality pertains;

for it lies back of *all* moral acts, and gives rise to them. It belongs to our *constitution*, as moral agents. It is self love—desire of happiness. A sinful principle can dictate nothing but sin. A holy principle can dictate nothing but holiness. But self-love, controlled by *neither*, can dictate *either*. In Adam it dictated the *first sinful* act. In all his posterity, who become holy, it dictates the *first holy* act. But it cannot dictate a holy act, and a sinful act, at the same time. It cannot form a holy principle, while its opposite, the selfish principle, is dictating. What then? The selfish principle must *cease* to dictate. Its active agency must be suspended—it must stand entirely *still*." pp. 19, 20.

What does E. P. mean by dictating? Does he mean that one voluntary act, is dictated by an antecedent voluntary act? This is the old Arminian notion of a self-determining power, and involves the absurdity of supposing volition before the first volition. Or does he speak merely of the motives which prompt to action. When he says that "a sinful principle can dictate nothing but sin, and a holy principle can dictate nothing but holiness;" does he mean, that a holy being always acts with a good intention, and a sinful being, with a bad intention? If this is his meaning, it is doubtless true. But now for the question—How can self-love dictate either a holy or sinful act? According to him, and to the Reviewer, to be actuated by self-love, is to be actuated by a motive that is neither right nor wrong.—Consequently the act which is dictated by self-love, is neither right nor wrong—neither sinful nor holy. How then can self-love dictate either a holy or sinful act? How can a man do either right or wrong, with no good or bad intention? Will E. P. be so good as to inform us?

Besides—If self-love can dictate either a holy or sinful act, what radical distinction is there between holiness and sin? Actions that flow from the same motive, must possess the same moral character.

"But how is the selfish principle suspended? So far as the sinner is *passive*, by the action of truth and motives, addressed to his conscience, and his self-love, aided by divine influence. So far as he is *active*, by his performing those acts, which, in the nature of the case, are necessarily implied in the event." p. 20.

But by what are these acts dictated? By the selfish principle, or by self-love? Not by the selfish principle, for "this selfish principle cannot cast out itself. Can satan cast out satan?" By self-love? But self-love cannot dictate till the selfish principle is suspended. "One thing at a time." While selfishness is dictating, self-love cannot get a chance to dictate those acts which involve the suspension of the selfish principle. But let us look at E. P.'s illustration.

"Suppose, for illustration, that a man has formed some wicked purpose, and gone forth to its execution. You overtake him, and begin to expostulate. His purpose is fixed, and at first he turns a deaf ear. You beseech his *attention*. If he does not give it, he will go on with his purpose, and involve himself in guilt and ruin. This then illustrates the sinner's first act, towards regeneration. Whether you say it has any tendency towards that result, or not, it is that without which it will not take place. You then appeal to his conscience, and expose the guilt of his conduct. He feels a throb of anguish. He is convicted of his sin. You also address his self-love. You tell him that his wicked purpose will terminate in his ruin. Though it may afford him pleasure now, it will ultimately fill him with anguish. You present both his guilt and danger, in their appalling aspect, before him, and beseech him to *consider* his ways—How much more happy is innocence than guilt. He does consider, and the conviction deepens. This illustrates another step, towards the sinner's regeneration. In this process of attention and consideration, which involves numerous simple mental acts, his thoughts and feelings are all finally withdrawn from his wicked purpose, and absorbed in the subject of your address. Thus his wicked purpose is suspended—and as it were *stands still*. *Now* he can form a *new* purpose,—a purpose to obey you—a purpose to return home, and behave right. But until the new purpose is *formed*, his old purpose, though suspended, is not *destroyed*. This is done, only by forming a *new* purpose; on the principle of what Dr. Chalmers calls "the expulsive power of a new affection." If the new purpose is not formed, the old purpose will resume its control, and act with more violence than ever." p. 21.

The Reviewer has given an illustration somewhat similar.

"Suppose the *avaricious* principle to suffer momentary suspensions in the breast of a miser; and the result to be, that he does occasionally a generous act. Let us imagine some one to account for this fact, by saying that very powerful appeals were made, in these cases, to the miser's feelings of tenderness and compassion. Now it is easy to see that this explanation would be wholly unsatisfactory to any one, who had previously assumed that no such feelings did or could exist in the miser's bosom—that all his actions were to be resolved into the single principle of avarice." p. 35.

Now these illustrations proceed upon very inadequate views of human depravity. It is one thing for a sinner to change one sinful purpose for another, and quite a different thing to give up the love of sin altogether. The former implies no suspension of selfishness, but is perfectly consistent with the ruling motive by which he is constantly actuated. The miser, when he performs a deed of charity, is as selfish, as when he hoards his money in his coffers. And in the case supposed by E. P., the man may change his purpose, without supposing any suspension of selfishness, or change of moral character.

But this illustration is defective on another account. What is a purpose suspended, which is not destroyed by the formation of a new purpose? It is a purpose which still exists. A purpose is a determination. The man is still determined—still bent on the perpetration of the wicked deed. His *purpose* therefore is *not suspended;* but only the execution of it. He

hesitates and trembles in view of the consequences; but still he does not give up his wicked purpose, until a new purpose is formed. E. P.'s illustration, therefore falls short of the object for which it was adduced.

But let us take another illustration. By the selfish principle is meant, the carnal mind which is enmity against God. You come to the sinner with the message of Jehovah. Perhaps he turns a deaf ear and will not hear you. But if through the strivings of the Spirit, his attention is arrested, he listens to your message. You exhibit to his view the character of God. It excites his enmity. It is an object which he cannot contemplate without aversion. You set before him his obligations, and exhibit the guilt of his conduct. His conscience condemns him, and he is seized with remorse; but still he hates his duty and loves his sins no less than before. You place before him the consequences of transgression—you point him to a coming judgment and to the tremendous realities of eternity. His fears are excited—as he looks forward to eternity, trembling and horror seize upon him, and he exclaims in anguish, what shall I do? You spread out before him the terms of pardon revealed in the gospel. He abhors those terms. He would give all the world to purchase exemption from future punishment; but he will not submit to God and accept a free salvation. You dwell on the reasonableness of these terms: but the more you pour light into his mind, the more you excite the enmity of his heart. The more you urge him to submit, the more his proud heart resists. And thus he struggles, till by the Almighty energy of the Divine Spirit, his stubborn heart is subdued. Then it is that the sinner ceases to be supremely selfish, when the love of God is shed abroad in the heart by the Holy Ghost. What foundation is there, then, for the Reviewer's theory of the suspension of the selfish principle, and of sinners' using the means of regeneration? What one act of the sinner indicates that he has ceased to be selfish, till the act of submission? Does he think on his ways? Yes, but he still loves his sins. Does he contemplate divine truth? Yes—but he hates it. Does he consider what is for his highest good? Yes—but he abhors the terms on which alone his highest interests can be secured. Does he desire to be happy? Yes—but not to be holy. Does he long for deliverance from future wrath? Yes—but not on the conditions of the gospel. Does he make efforts to escape the punishment threatened against sin? Yes—but he goes about to establish his own righteousness. Is the

enmity of his heart abated? Not in the least; but the more he is enlightened in the knowledge of God and his duty, the more it is called into exercise. In all which he does, till he submits to God, he is as completely selfish, as at any former period of his life. This is not philosophy, but plain matter of fact, attested by the experience of God's people and the word of God.

It was asked in the Strictures, "What is the moral character of the man after the suspension of the selfish principle and previous to regeneration?" To this the Reviewer replies,

"Dr. Tyler's question amounts to this: what is a man's moral character when he is employed for an indivisible moment in the very act of performing his duty, *before* it is performed; or what is his character *after* duty is begun, and *before* it is finished." p. 32.

This however is not the amount of my question. My question is not, what is a man's character while doing his duty. Concerning this there can be no doubt. When a man is doing his duty he is holy. When he begins to do his duty, he begins to be holy. He begins to act with a good moral intention, and this indicates a change of heart.

"Now we ask, what is the moral character of the man *after* the commencement of the act of "perception" or "mind's view" of the object, and *before* the act of the will? If Dr. Tyler says, such questions are the height of absurdity, why then does he ask them?" p. 32.

I have asked no such questions. My question is, what is the character of the sinner while performing those "acts which" the Reviewer says, "are not sinful, and which he may perform, and must perform, or he will never be regenerated?" What is his character while he takes into solemn consideration the question whether the highest happiness is to be found in God or in the world—While he pursues this inquiry till it result in conviction—While he follows up this conviction with engrossing contemplation—While he perseveres in this contemplation—And while he is making direct and desperate efforts to give his heart to God? Now if the sinner does perform these acts after the suspension of the selfish principle, and previous to a change of heart, is it so very impertinent to ask, what is his character while performing them?

"We might turn the question upon Dr. Tyler, and ask: while the sinner is "*apprehending* the excellence of the divine character," while he is *regarding* it as the greater good, prior to the "consequent" preference, what is he doing? Is he holy? Then is he holy, before he is holy Is he sinning? Then sin is necessary to holiness. It remains for him to inform us, whether

these acts which are necessary, as he tells us, to the act of the will, as the ground or reason of it, proceed "from a holy heart or a sinful heart, or no heart at all?" p. 33.

Now does the Reviewer need to be informed, that the intellectual apprehension which is essential to an act of choice, is not a voluntary act, and consequently proceeds from no heart at all? The Reviewer says,

"Is there no *possible* way in which this suspension of the selfish principle can be accomplished? If not, then how can the heart *ever* exercise holy love? If the selfish principle *must* dictate every mental act or state, then either selfishness must dictate holy love, i. e. enmity itself must love, or love is utterly impossible." p. 36.

The fallacy of this reasoning lies in supposing that every voluntary act must be dictated by a preceding voluntary act, which brings us to the exploded doctrine of a self-determining power. If love takes the place of enmity, does enmity love?

"We shall now avail ourselves of the aid of Dr. Tyler himself. Speaking of the manner in which the change in regeneration is produced, he says, "he (the sinner) *now* loves, what *before* he hated." "In his *last* act of rebellion, he was a moral agent. In his *first* act of obedience, he is a moral agent." p. 41. Is not this saying in the most explicit terms, that the *last* act of rebellion had existed and *ceased*, *before* the *first* act of obedience was rendered?" p. 36.

What then? Why, says the Reviewer, "How could this be if the hatred, the act of rebellion, had not been *renounced*, and had not actually ceased from the mind?" *Renounced!* How? By an act or series of acts which intervene between the last act of rebellion, and the first act of obedience? Or by actually obeying? What is it to renounce rebellion, but to submit? But the last act of rebellion must precede the first act of submission. True; and is this all that the Reviewer means? Where then is the place for that series of acts and states of mind, which constitute using the means of regeneration?

The seven queries in the Strictures, intended to present in a single view the legitimate consequences of the Reviewer's theory, were sustained by numerous references to his own language. Whether I have misconstrued his language, the reader must judge. I certainly have not done it intentionally in a single instance. Nor have I intimated that he adopts as his actual belief the consequences which I attempted to deduce from his theory. That these consequences do necessarily result from his system, was my honest belief, and I must be permitted to continue in this belief, till the Reviewer has given a more satisfactory interpretation of his own language. I do not deem it

necessary to go over the whole of this ground again. I am willing to submit my queries with the quotations and references by which they are sustained, to the decision of the impartial reader.

In regard to the questions however, whether his theory does not involve the doctrine of progressive regeneration, and whether his statements in his fourth number, and in his reply to the Strictures, are not inconsistent with what he had previously written, I must ask the reader's attention to a few remarks.

I stated in the Strictures, that the Reviewer "supposes regeneration, in the common, popular import of the term, to commence, when the selfish principle is suspended, and the sinner begins to use the means of regeneration. The sinner then ceases to sin, and a process of acts and states of mind commences, which tend to a change of heart, and which if not interrupted and effectually counteracted, will eventually result in such a change." I stated also, "I am aware that he has said 'it is not claimed that this process, or that any part of it, is, or must be of long continuance;' also that it *may be* so rapid, that there shall be 'no measurable duration between the first and last act of the series;' yet unless I entirely misunderstand him, he supposes it may occupy no inconsiderable space of time." These statements, I supposed to be authorised by the Reviewer's language. I did not understand him to assert in his first three numbers, that the sinner *never does in fact* begin to use the means of regeneration till the *identical* moment that he is born again. On the contrary, I did understand him to assert, what is utterly inconsistent with such a supposition. I supposed that he meant to be understood, that although this mental process *might be so rapid* that it should occupy no measurable duration, yet that *in point of fact*, it ordinarily does occupy a measurable duration. I did also suppose, that in describing the process which constitutes using the means of regeneration, he did include acts which *may*, and *ordinarily do*, exist, previous to the identical moment of regeneration. If he did not mean to be so understood, I trust it will appear, that it is not altogether the fault of his readers, that his meaning has been misapprehended. Let us then attend to some of his representations. The question now, is, what does the Reviewer represent as using the means of regeneration? He has stated explicitly, "that no acts of the sinner, done while the selfish principle remains active in the heart, constitute using the means of regeneration." p. 22. Also, that "previous to regeneration in the

ordinary sense of the term, men are represented in the scriptures as enemies to God. *Every act* is treated as *a persistence in rebellion.*" p. 212. Also, that there are no acts which constitute using the means of regeneration, "unless those acts be intended which are included in the comprehensive import of the word. There are no other acts, which do not constitute a *palpable perversion* and *abuse* of the means of regeneration—no others which do not *tend directly to prevent it*—no others which are not *sinful and abominable to God*—no others therefore, which can be supposed for a moment to constitute using the means of regeneration." p. 216. I wish the reader to keep these declarations constantly in mind, while examining the extracts which I am about to adduce.

According to these statements, if regeneration "in the comprehensive import of the word," occupies only an "indivisible moment," then previous to that moment, there are no acts performed by the sinner, which are not a PALPABLE PERVERSION and ABUSE of the means of regeneration—none which do not TEND DIRECTLY TO PREVENT IT—none which are not SINFUL and ABOMINABLE to God. Now does this accord with the representations given by the Reviewer?

In his first number, after showing that acts which are dictated by the selfish principle do not constitute using the means of regeneration, he says,

"The acts of the sinner under consideration are not necessary to his regeneration, because his regeneration may be connected with those of a different character. We have already said, that the sinner is the subject of that constitutional desire of happiness, called self-love, to which no moral quality pertains. Let the sinner then, as a being who loves happiness and desires the highest degree of it, under the influence of such a desire, take into solemn consideration the question whether the highest happiness is to be found in God or in the world; let him pursue this inquiry, if need be, till it result in the conviction that such happiness is to be found in God only;—and let him follow up this conviction with that intent and engrossing contemplation of the realities which truth discloses, and with that stiring up of his sensibilities in view of them, which shall invest the world, when considered as his only portion, with an aspect of insignificance, of gloom and even of terror, and which shall chill and suspend his present active love of it; and let the contemplation be persevered in, till it shall discover a reality and an excellence in the objects of holy affection, which shall put him upon direct and desperate efforts to fix his heart upon them; and let this process of thought, of effort, and of action, be entered upon as one which is never to be abandoned, until the end proposed by it, is accomplished,—until the only living and true God is loved and chosen, as his God forever; and we say, that in this way the work of his regeneration, through grace, *may be* accomplished. On this course he may *now* enter, instead of rejecting or perverting or abusing or sinfully using, the truths of God another moment. In this way, he may become a child of God, while truth and duty are present in his thoughts.

Whence then the necessity to the sinner's regeneration, of those acts which are dictated by the selfish principle? Is it that the acts now described are impossible? But man is a moral agent, and therefore possesses those constitutional properties, viz. the self-love, the power of contemplating the objects of choice, and those susceptibilities to the good and evil set before him, which fully qualify him for the process described. IS NOT THIS INDEED SUBSTANTIALLY THE ACTUAL PROCESS IN EVERY INSTANCE OF REGENERATION?" pp. 32, 33.

"In this process, the sinner, from the desire of happiness, turns his thoughts to the decisions and discoveries of eternal truth. He sees and feels, that the world taken as his portion in this life, brings with it eternal torment in the next. Through his dread of the misery connected with it, this object of affection loses its attractions, and is, as the case may be, so overcast with gloominess, that his active love and pursuit of it ceases. Now too he sees that the supreme good is in God only; and that there is a desirableness surpassing what belongs to all things beside, in becoming a child and an heir of God. Under these convictions and feelings, with far clearer intellectual apprehensions, and a higher excitement of constitutional susceptibilities than are supposable in any other circumstances, he attempts by direct effort to fix his supreme affections on the object so worthy of them; but he attempts it in vain. The heart still withholds its love from a perfect God. That habitude of the soul, which results from having its sensibilities so long exercised on earthly vanities, and unexercised on the divine glories, now shows its power not only in stifling the flow of holy affection, but in divesting even God of the aspect of reality. Surely, if the power of sin to stupify and benumb the spirit can be appreciated by the sinner, it must be when he thus summons his heart to fix its affections on God, and summons it in vain. If the triumphs of grace over obduracy and sin can be displayed in the sinner's experience, in accordance with the testimony of the divine word, it is done in the transformation of a heart so dull, so cold, so dead, as the sinner thus finds his own to be. Wherefore then, we again inquire, are those acts of the sinner which are dictated by the selfish principle, necessary to his regeneration?" pp. 33, 34.

I would now ask the Reviewer, whether when he penned these paragraphs, he supposed himself to be describing a process of acts and states of mind, which never does *in fact* commence, till the identical moment when the sinner submits to God? Does he believe that the sinner never does "take into solemn consideration the question whether the highest happiness is to be found in God or the world" until this identical moment? It is not sufficient for him to say, that this process *may be* so rapid as not to occupy any measurable duration. The question is, is it so *invariably* in *point of fact?* For the Reviewer tells us that he is describing what is "SUBSTANTIALLY THE ACTUAL PROCESS IN EVERY INSTANCE OF REGENERATION." Besides—if any of these acts should be performed previous to the commencement of regeneration, in the comprehensive sense of the term, they would, according to his own principles, constitute "a PALPABLE PERVERSION and ABUSE of the means of regeneration," and "TEND DIRECTLY TO PREVENT IT." Now did the Reviewer in these paragraphs, intend to be

understood, as describing a process which *never does*, and *never can* commence, till the identical moment that the sinner gives his heart to God? But he tells us,

"When we spoke therefore of the sinner's "*persevering* in the effort" to give his heart to God, we pointed him to a class of acts, (viz. those dictated by a desire of happiness) from which alone, that result could be expected. But we did not direct or authorize him to perform those acts, in that low degree in which they are not associated with the change of the will or heart. On the contrary, we called him to the "*direct* effort" of giving his soul to God. We called upon him not to relax or abandon it, but to "strive" —to persevere. And we added, though Dr. Tyler has omitted this part of our statement, that he might be *instantly* successful. We said, "he may become a child of God, while truth and duty are PRESENT in his thoughts." p. 39.

The question, at present, is not what *may be done*, but what actually is done. Suppose that the sinner performs these acts, but in so low a degree that they are not *instantly* connected with regeneration, does he mean to affirm that they are in that case a "palpable PERVERSION and ABUSE of the means of regeneration?"* Is he describing acts which in his view *ever* tend directly to PREVENT regeneration? If so, why does he distinguish them from those which he had previously described?

Again. What is the object of the second number of the Review? After a few remarks by way of recapitulation the Reviewer says,

"We shall now proceed, in accordance with our original design, to show III. That those acts which are thus dictated by the instinctive desire of happiness, and which are prior to that act of the will or heart called regeneration in the *restricted* sense of the term, constitute the sinner's using the means of grace." p. 210.

Here I would request the reader to pause and notice particularly the proposition thus formally stated. What is it which the Reviewer proposes to prove? Compare this with the following statement in his reply to the Strictures.

"When we affirmed that regeneration never takes place without the solemn contemplation of divine truth, we maintained that this contemplation does not belong to that class of mental acts which are dictated by the selfish principle. We then pointed to another class—to acts resulting from a simple desire of happiness, and stated, that in *this* class alone, were those acts to be found, which constitute a using of the means in question. But did we affirm or intimate, that *all* acts belonging even to this class, were a using of these means? Far from it." p. 37.

* Suppose it should be five minutes from the time the sinner begins to consider his ways, before he gives his heart to God; will the Reviewer say, that he meant to be understood, that the sinner in that case does not begin to use the means of regeneration, till the last of these moments, and that all his thoughts and feelings and efforts during the preceding four minutes *are sinful and abominable to God*, and *tend directly to prevent* his regeneration?

Now I ask, is there any such distinction in the above proposition? Does the Reviewer propose to show that *some acts* belonging to a *particular class of acts*, constitute, &c.? Does the phrase "those acts—which are prior," mean some of those acts which are prior? Did the Reviewer intend to use language so loosely? Besides; what is this "class of acts" of which the Reviewer is speaking? It is that class of acts which are dictated by "the simple desire of happiness" or self love, in distinction from those which are dictated by the "selfish principle." They are acts of course, which according to the whole tenor of the Reviewer's reasoning, are not sinful. But the Reviewer has told us, that there are no acts performed by the sinner antecedent to regeneration, "unless those be intended which are included in the comprehensive import of the word—which are not SINFUL and ABOMINABLE to God." Now did the Reviewer mean to affirm that a part of that class of acts which he has described, and which he tells us are dictated not by selfishness but by self-love, are *sinful and abominable to God*? This he must say, or he must admit that he did mean to include all these acts in regeneration in its comprehensive sense; and to represent them as using the means of regeneration. That the passages quoted in the Strictures do describe a series of acts which cannot be regarded as simultaneous, the Reviewer admits. But he says,

"In these passages, without exception, we were speaking of acts, (and the passages themselves show the fact most clearly,) which are so *imperfect in degree* through counteracting influences, that instead of resulting in regeneration and becoming the means of it, they often result in a more absolute confirmation in iniquity." p. 37.

But does the Reviewer mean to intimate that he has represented no acts as using the means of regeneration which are not infalibly connected with regeneration? Has he not repeatedly denied that there is an infallible connexion between any acts performed by the sinner, and a change of heart? Has he not said that "there is *at best* but a peradventure that God will give him repentance?" Now surely the Reviewer has maintained that sinners do *sometimes* use the means of regeneration, and according to his own principles, whatever that use may be, it may result "in a more absolute confirmation in iniquity." How then could he expect his readers to understand, that he did not mean to represent the acts in question as using the means of regeneration, merely because he has

said they do not invariably result in regeneration* when he has said this of all acts performed by the unrenewed sinner—I wish the reader to notice in this place, the following statement of the Reviewer.

"And we stated expressly, though Dr. Tyler denies that we have done so, that they may be in *kind*, what we described them to be, and yet may be so modified by circumstances, and so imperfect *in degree*, as to result in a more absolute confirmation in iniquity. Vid. pp. 222—230." p. 29.

But have I denied this? What I denied was, that the Reviewer on p. 222, had made a distinction, between that kind of acts, which when uncounteracted does, and when counteracted does not, constitute using the means of regeneration. I did not deny, but admitted fully what the Reviewer has here stated. I quoted the passage, that the reader might judge whether I was mistaken. The question is, whether, notwithstanding the Reviewer admits that the acts in question "may be so modified by circumstances, and so imperfect in degree, as to result in a more absolute confirmation in iniquity," he does not still contend that they have a tendency to produce regeneration, and consequently do constitute using the means of regeneration? But more of this presently.

We will now return to the Reviewer's train of reasoning.—We have seen what is the leading proposition with which he commenced his second number. In support of this proposition he alleges three arguments.

The first is derived from those principles which control the correct use and interpretation of language on a topic of this nature. The second is thus stated:

"In further support of our leading proposition, that the mental acts already described, constitute using the means of grace, we next allege their *tendency* to produce regeneration." p. 222.

Here again I wish the reader to pause and ask himself—what the Reviewer is proposing to prove. "That the mental acts already described constitute," &c. By the acts already described, he means the acts specified in his leading proposition. The Reviewer proceeds,

"By this, however, we do not intend to assert an *invariable* connection, between this kind of mental acts and the act of the will or heart. The

* If the Reviewer should now take the ground that the sinner's use of means is infallibly connected with regeneration—He must say, if sinners use the means they will be regenerated—if they do not use them, they will not be regenerated—consequently that there are conditions of regeneration—conditions, on compliance with which, we are warranted to assure them that God will renew their hearts.

former may be in *kind* what we have described them to be, and yet they may be greatly modified by circumstances and be very imperfect in degree. The intellectual perceptions and views dictated by self-love, as distinguished from selfishness, and the consequent excitement of the constitutional susceptibilities, may be so enfeebled, checked, and counteracted, by the previous habitudes of the mind, as to result in the re-adoption of the wrong moral preference, and a more absolute confirmation in iniquity. Nor do we intend that a *direct* tendency to a change of heart pertains to the first act in the process; but that, when self-love prompts the first act of sober consideration, there is in this act a tendency to augmented feeling, and that this feeling tends to fix contemplation, and this again to deeper feeling; and that thus, by the mutual action and reaction of thought and feeling, the process, were there no effectual counteracting influence, would go on until it terminated in a change of heart. Nor do we intend, in what we advance on this subject, to imply, that the strivings of the Divine Spirit, when self-love prompts the first act of serious consideration, are not necessary to overcome counteracting tendencies, and to continue that process of fixed contemplation and deepening emotion, which are requisite to a change of heart. Still less do we intend to assert, that these acts are ever performed in such a manner, as to result in a change of heart, without the influence of the Holy Spirit. The facts, however, which we have conceded, only confirm the truth of our present position; for they clearly imply a counteraction of the tendency which we assert, and the COUNTERACTION OF A TENDENCY IS DECISIVE PROOF OF ITS EXISTENCE." pp. 222, 223.

I desire the reader to examine this passage. What is the Reviewer attempting to prove? "That the acts already described" (not some of them merely) "constitute using the means of grace." True, he admits that they are not *invariably* connected with regeneration, (and what acts of the unrenewed sinner are?) He admits that they may be modified by circumstances, and be imperfect in degree—they may be enfeebled, checked, and counteracted by previous habitudes of the mind. But mark the conclusion of the paragraph. "The facts however which we have conceded, only *confirm* the truth of our POSITION;" (the reader will just look back and see what the position is,) "for they clearly imply the *counteraction of the tendency which we assert;* and THE COUNTERACTION OF A TENDENCY IS DECISIVE PROOF OF ITS EXISTENCE." Now that the Reviewer should affirm, and that he should still persist in affirming, that he did in this passage make a distinction between acts which when counteracted do not, and when uncounteracted do, constitute using the means of regeneration, is to me utterly astonishing. That such a distinction is explicitly stated, he cannot pretend; and to suppose it implied, would be to destroy his argument. His argument is, that the acts under consideration, do constitute using the means of regeneration, because they have a tendency to produce regeneration. He admits that they may be counteracted, but contends that this fact only confirms the truth of his position; for the *coun-*

teraction of a tendency is *decisive proof of its existence.* And that he was speaking not only of some acts of this class, but of the class itself, is evident from the first sentence of his next paragraph. "The tendency then, now claimed for the *class of mental* acts under consideration, may be evinced in many forms:" p. 223. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that the Reviewer was attempting to prove, that the mental acts which he had described, have a tendency to produce regeneration, and of course do constitute using the means of regeneration.

Besides. If they do not constitute using the means of regeneration, and are not included in regeneration in the comprehensive import of the word, they are according to the Reviewer's own principles "SINFUL AND ABOMINABLE TO GOD," and not only have no tendency to produce regeneration, but "TEND DIRECTLY TO PREVENT IT." Will the Reviewer say, that he meant to be understood to affirm, that those acts which are dictated not by selfishness but by self-love, when enfeebled, checked and counteracted by the previous habitudes of the mind, do "constitute a PALPABLE PERVERSION and ABUSE of the means of regeneration, and TEND DIRECTLY TO PREVENT IT?

The reader is desired to examine the following passage.

"While self-love awakens intense desires to comply with the terms of mercy, while it powerfully and successfully prompts the mind to look toward the only proper object of supreme affection, that the heart may fix upon it, still the object is too dimly seen. Whatever may be the correctness of the intellectual convictions, and the desirableness of becoming a child of God, the faculties and sensibilities of the mind now labor under the benumbing influence of sin, and divine realities are yet too remote and unreal, to draw forth the affections of the heart. The fact that the constitutional faculties and susceptibilities have been unexercised on divine things, has resulted in an appalling mental inertness and stupefaction. The transcendent glories of God are yet veiled by the cloud which previous sin has cast over the mind. Still, however, it is to be remembered that the sinner, disgusted with the former idols of his heart, and feeling deeply his exposure to the wrath of God, strongly desires, be the appointed means what they may, to escape the dreadful doom; that he is *willing* to fix, and does in fact fix the eye of contemplation upon the object of holy affection, and does, with such glimpses of its glories as he may obtain, feel their attractions and summon his heart to that love of God his Saviour, which is the only condition of his mercy.

We now ask, is there no tendency in these acts and states of the sinner's mind, to carry the soul forth to God in holy love? We do not affirm, that this tendency will not be effectually counteracted by opposing causes, unless the grace of God even at the moment of the nearest approximation to holy love, interposes to secure the act. But we ask, is there not a tendency which, if wholly *uncounteracted*, would flow out in holy love to God? Can the vanity of the world be thus seen and felt, its insufficiency to bless, and its power to destroy, be thus justly appreciated; can God be intellectually known, looked upon with the eye of fixed and thoughtful contemplation,

and heard inviting the miserable transgressor to Himself; can his sensibility to life and death be thus roused, and fixed in intense desire upon making God his friend, in view of the only condition of his friendship, and yet there be no tendency in such a state of mind towards the love of God, and confidence in his mercy?" pp. 230, 231.

Will the Reviewer pretend that he is here describing acts and states of mind, which *tend directly to prevent* regeneration? If not, then he is describing acts and states of mind, which he supposes to be included in regeneration in the comprehensive import of the term, and which do constitute using the means of regeneration. I stated in the Strictures that the Reviewer had not only made no distinction on p. 222, between that kind of mental acts which when counteracted, does not, and when uncounteracted does, constitute using the means of regeneration; but that he had made no such distinction in the twelve following pages. The whole course of his argument is to prove, from their tendency, that the acts of which he speaks, (whether counteracted or not, whether invariably connected with regeneration or not) do constitute using the means of regeneration. The Reviewer however has found one passage on p. 232, which he thinks may be so construed as to express this distinction. That the reader may judge whether he is correct, I will quote the passage in its connection.

"We ask him (the sinner) to suppose that he had turned his thoughts away from the world and its vanities, instead of turning them from God and eternal realities,—and this, not for a few moments only, but in some prolonged, intent and solemn consideration of the things testified of God, would he not have seen himself, in his present character and eternal prospects, to be exactly what God says he is,—a sinner, guilty and lost, without hope and on the brink of everlasting perdition; would not this view of himself have broken up his present security in sin, blasted his high hopes, and arrested his eager pursuit of earthly joys; would he not have trembled, when thus looking into the dark world of hell; and was not the known certainty of all this, the very reason why he shut out the light of truth from his mind? And we ask him yet again, whether, had he suffered these thoughts and these feelings, uncounteracted and unresisted, to occupy and engross the mind, and had he given himself up to such views and emotions as he might be supposed to do, were death looking him in the face, he might not also have been willing to relinquish the idol of his heart, and to be saved even by the Son of God, from the fiery indignation which he would have seen to be coming upon him. Now we say, it is in vain to deny the facts which these interrogatories are designed to disclose. They are known in the consciousness of every sinner, living under the light of divine truth. They involve thoughts and feelings which, when truth is presented to his mind, he cannot avoid, and make known to him its power, and what its effects would be, were he still to think of it. [*These are the very thoughts and the very feelings in kind, which in their progressive degrees, we have described as constituting the means of regeneration.*"] p. 232.

The sentence included in brackets, is the passage on which the Reviewer relies. But what is the obvious import of this

sentence? "These are the very thoughts and the very feelings *in kind*."—They cannot then be sinful thoughts and feelings—thoughts and feelings, which constitute a palpable PERVERSION and ABUSE of the means of regeneration, and which TEND DIRECTLY TO PREVENT IT. The very thoughts and feelings, "which in their *progressive degrees*" (which in their progress from one degree to another) "we have described as constituting" &c. Such I understood to be the meaning of the Reviewer; and such it seems to me, is the plain and obvious meaning of the passage. But he says, "This was not our meaning—When we spoke of this kind of acts, as those which in their progressive degrees constitute using the means of regeneration, we meant simply, that when existing in some of those higher degrees, in which, by a previous progress in fact, they often come to exist, they then constitute using the means of regeneration." If this was his meaning, I ask, why did he not say so? Why, instead of saying "in their progressive degrees," did he not say, "in some of those higher degrees, in which they often come to exist?" Suppose that in giving an account of a man who had ruined himself by a course of dissipation, I should describe the various temptations by which he had been assailed, and the different states of mind through which he had passed while yielding to one temptation after another, and should say, "these are the very thoughts and the very feelings which in their *progressive degrees*" effected his ruin;—Who would understand me to include in the means of his ruin, only the last stages of his progress in vice? The Reviewer, doubtless, has a right to interpret his own language. But if he gives to it a meaning entirely different from its plain and obvious meaning, he must not complain of his readers for misunderstanding him.

But I have another question to propose. When does the sinner begin to use the means of regeneration? The Reviewer shall answer.

"God tells the sinner, that it is better to obey than to disobey HIM. The thought conveyed to the mind of the sinner is an arrow in his sentient nature. It penetrates, it fastens, it is felt. The appropriate tendency of the feeling is to *the voluntary act of sober, solemn consideration*.—This act the sinner has power to do or to avoid. And here the mental process of using the means of regeneration either begins, or does not begin. If he thus considers, it begins; and now the appropriate tendency of consideration is to deepen emotion; and thus by the mutual influence of thought and feeling, the tendency of the mind to that entire mental process which we have described, and the tendency of the process to a change of heart, become undeniable and conspicuous in human consciousness." p. 227.

Let the reader compare this passage with the whole passage

quoted above. In that passage the Reviewer asks the sinner "to suppose that he had turned his thoughts away from the world and its vanities, instead of turning them from God and eternal realities—and this *not for a few moments only*, [mark this,] but in some *prolonged, intent*, AND SOLEMN CONSIDERATION." Now when does the mental process of using the means of regeneration begin? According to the Reviewer's statement in the passage last quoted, it begins with this act of *solemn consideration*. And yet the Reviewer would now have us understand that the sinner does not begin to use the means of regeneration, till his thoughts and feelings, "by a previous progress in fact" have arrived to "some of those higher degrees in which they often come to exist."

"Every act, then, of sober consideration, employed on the great truth that our supreme good is to be found only in the service of God, when dictated exclusively by self-love, implies, for the time being, the suspended influence of the selfish principle. Such suspension, however, does not necessarily prevent the thoughts and desires of the mind from recurring, as it were, *instantly* to the object of selfish affection, nor the affection itself from resuming *instantly* its accustomed activity and power. Indeed, the tendency to this, from the previous habitudes of the mind, is direct and powerful. It is, however, to be remembered, that the mind is capable of opposite *tendencies* at the same time; and that, in the present case, there are tendencies opposite to that specified,—the tendency of excited self-love to sober consideration, and of this to deepen such excitement. When these tendencies are not successfully counteracted by opposing tendencies, when, by the strivings of the Spirit, they are perpetuated and increased, then it is that the selfish principle not only suffers temporary suspensions, but grows weaker and weaker in each instance of its returning activity and dominion; until at some point before the heart fixes on God, the power and influence of this principle wholly cease from the mind." pp. 227, 228.

Is not this the description of a gradual process? "Every act of sober consideration, &c. implies for the time being the suspended influence of the selfish principle"—and here "the mental process of using the means of regeneration begins."—It is true this suspension does not necessarily prevent the thoughts and desires of the mind from recurring to the objects of selfish affection. But still the tendency of excited self-love, is to sober consideration, and of this to deepen excitement; and when these tendencies by the strivings of the Spirit, are perpetuated and increased, the selfish principle grows weaker and weaker in each instance of its returning activity, till at some point before the heart fixes on God, the power and influence of this principle entirely cease from the mind. That is to say, the heart of the sinner becomes less and less obdurate—the carnal mind gradually loses its strength, till its power finally ceases. The reader is desired to compare this representation with the

account given by Dr. Dwight of the opinion of those who maintain that regeneration is a progressive work. "The scheme of those who oppose this doctrine, (that regeneration is instantaneous,) appears, generally, to have been this: The subject of regeneration is supposed to begin, at some time or other, to turn his attention to spiritual concerns. He begins seriously to think of them; to dwell upon them in the house of God, in his meditations, in his closet, and in his conversation. By degrees, he gains a more thorough acquaintance with the guilt and danger of sin, and the importance of holiness, pardon, acceptance, and salvation. By degrees also, he renounces one sinful practice and propensity, after another; and finally thus arrives at a *neutral character*, in which he is neither a sinner in the absolute sense, nor yet a Christian. Advancing from this stage, he begins, at length, to entertain in a small degree, virtuous affections, and to adopt virtuous conduct." *Theol. vol.* III. *p.* 70.

I shall adduce but one passage more.

"Who has not traced this process of thought and feeling, not perhaps in entirely excluding after one momentary suspension of the selfish principle, the recurrence of worldly thoughts, desires and affections, but in weakening the power of that principle, till its suspension became more absolute, and till the objects of that principle lost their former interest, and became matters of comparative indifference? Or, when the mind is strongly impressed with 'the powers of the world to come,' who has not seen the pursuits of pleasure and of business regarded with disgust and irksomeness; and, as it were, attended with no thought, no purpose, no action to secure those objects, which once absorbed the whole man? Who that has been familiar with these scenes, has not heard from the sinner the plaintive language of deep emotion; 'it is not the world which I desire. I see—I feel its vanity. I see the certainty and the justice of the fearful doom to which the pursuit of it leads its votaries. I desire a more substantial good, and most of all an interest in the Saviour of sinners?' We now ask, is it possible, that in such a mind, the selfish principle, or worldly purpose of the heart still retains its active power and efficient influence? Can these facts be accounted for, without admitting the fact of the suspension of the selfish principle, in its controlling dominion in the mind!" p. 228.

I can assure the Reviewer, that I have often witnessed the scenes which he describes—I have seen sinners so impressed with the powers of the world to come, that the pursuits of pleasure and of business, were regarded with disgust and irksomeness. I have heard the plaintive language of deep emotion, it is not the world which I desire—I see, I feel its vanity. Yes, I have heard the sinner exclaim, I would give all the world for an interest in Christ—But I never dreamed that sinners in this state of mind, had ceased to be supremely selfish. On the contrary, I have witnessed in these circumstances some of the most affecting exhibitions of supreme selfishness, and enmity to God.

I have seen the sinner struggling for days, and weeks in this state of mind; and so far was the selfish principle, or the enmity of his heart from growing weaker and weaker, that it increased in strength continually, until it was slain by the power of the Holy Ghost and gave place to the exercise of holy love.

I certainly have no wish to misrepresent the Reviewer, and I have given the foregoing copious extracts that the reader may be able to judge whether I have misconstrued his language. If he still insists, that his scheme does not involve the doctrine of progressive regeneration, he must explain his language to the satisfaction of the Christian public. Bare assertions, and heavy charges of misrepresentation will not answer the purpose—It will not be sufficient to show, that he has explicitly disavowed his belief in this doctrine. I have not charged him with adopting it as a part of his creed; but I have endeavoured to show, that it follows from his principles, and is involved in his statements. I have not denied that he has advanced positions in his fourth number, utterly inconsistent with the statements in the foregoing extracts. This I attempted to show in my Appendix. But as he insists that there is a perfect accordance between those positions and the whole tenor of his preceding remarks, and charges me with grossly misinterpreting his language,—I have felt it a duty which I owed to myself, and to the reader, to enter upon the foregoing investigation.

If I have entirely misunderstood the Reviewer, and if he has been misunderstood by a large portion of the Christian community, it surely becomes him to inquire, whether there is not some ground for this misunderstanding, besides the dulness and inattention of his readers.

But let us take the last statements of the Reviewer. Is it not a little wonderful, that he should write a hundred pages to prove that sinners do use the means of regeneration, and that they must use them or they never can be regenerated, and then after all, allow them *no time* in which to use them? According to his last statements, there is no time, "no while," between the suspension of the selfish principle, and the act of holy love. And yet in this space, which is *no space*, in this time, which is *no time*, the sinner must use the means of regeneration, or he cannot be regenerated. He must take into solemn consideration the question whether the highest happiness is to be found in God or in the world—He must pursue this inquiry till it result in conviction—He must follow up this conviction with engrossing contemplation—He must persevere in this

contemplation—He must put himself upon direct and desperate efforts to give his heart to God, and resolve never to abandon this process of thought and feeling and effort, till the object is attained. All this he must do in *no time*. And yet if he does it at all, there is *at best* but a peradventure, that he will ever be regenerated. And what is more marvellous still, is, that while the sinner is thus using the means of regeneration, he is in the very act of performing his duty; and yet is acting with no good moral intention.

But further—Supposing that the Reviewer in his first three numbers, did not mean to intimate that sinners ever do, properly speaking, use the means of regeneration, till the "identical moment" when the new birth takes place—Supposing that when he described the protracted process of mental acts, which, as he says, are dictated not by selfishness, but by self-love, he meant to include only a part of this process under the term regeneration, when used in its comprehensive sense; still I would inquire, does he not *evidently* represent the moral transformation of the sinner as a gradual work? Does he not teach that the selfish principle does suffer temporary suspensions, and gradually grows weaker and weaker? Does he not represent the sinner as being the subject of sincere desires after future happiness, which are not selfish—and as making repeated unsuccessful efforts to give his heart to God, which are not selfish? Does he not represent the sinner, while under the strivings of the Spirit, as becoming less and less stubborn, and more and more inclined to yield to the claims of the gospel? If so, the principle is the same, whether he call the whole of this process regeneration, and a using of the means of regeneration, or only a part of it. It is in effect, the very principle maintained by those who deny that regeneration is an instantaneous change. And it is in my apprehension, a view of the subject utterly inconsistent with facts.—It is not true, that antecedent to regeneration, the selfish principle grows weaker and weaker. On the contrary, in the last stages of conviction,—while the sinner is so overwhelmed with a sense of his guilt and danger, that he loses all interest in the concerns of time, the selfish principle is as active as ever; and is evinced in direct opposition to the terms of pardon, and in efforts to establish a self-righteousness. The Reviewer often seems to suppose, that the great difficulty which lies in the way of the sinner's loving God, is the want of clear and distinct views of his character—"The object is too dimly seen"—"The transcendant glories of God are yet veiled

by the cloud which previous sin has cast over the mind"—"Divine realities are yet too remote and unreal to draw forth the affections of the heart."—Now the truth is, when divine objects are brought near and become real to the mind of the sinner, so far from drawing forth the love, they invariably draw forth the opposition of the heart—The selfish principle, the carnal mind with all its enmity to God, remains in full strength, till the heart is changed by the power of the Holy Ghost.—*Even when we were dead in sin, hath quickened us together with Christ.*

Omitting many things in the Reviewer's reply, on which I had intended to remark, I pass to a consideration of what he has said respecting the mode of the sinner's dependence. He seems evidently to imagine, that he has discovered some new light on this subject, which is of great use in obviating the objection of sinners that they have nothing to do. To unfold this discovery, he would have us to understand, was the great object of his whole treatise. E. P. is exceedingly delighted with this new discovery. He thinks it "disengages (religious truth) from fetters imposed by human hands"—"removes obstructions and prepares the way for the naked feet of the gospel"—"removes every barrier between the sinner and the truth and the Spirit of God"—and "leaves the Spirit of God, with the freedom and might of God, to hurl the energies of the truth of God, at the unprotected soul of the sinner." He seems to anticipate glorious effects, "glorious victories in the earth" from this new theological discovery, and even thinks it would be worth the Reviewer's while, to write another hundred pages on such a subject.

But what is this new light, which has been kept hid from past generations—this new view of the mode of the sinner's dependence?

The view which has generally been given of this subject by orthodox divines, particularly in New England, is, that sinners are free moral agents, and capable of doing their duty; but that such is the perverseness of their hearts, they never will do it, unless they are made willing in the day of God's power.

Now the Reviewer, notwithstanding all that he has said on this subject, is obliged to admit that this is the true view. He says,

"We have then the testimony of God to the fact, not that man *cannot* change his own heart, but to the fact that although he *can*, he *never will change it*; to the appalling fact of a voluntary perverseness of heart, which will forever render vain and ineffectual all truth and motives, and which

alike deserves perdition, and secures continuance in rebellion against the Most High; to the fact, that this giant rebel never was and never will be reclaimed to God, but by the power of God." p. 508.

Now I ask, in what respect does this representation differ from that which is given above? If there is any difference, I am certainly unable to discern it. Where, then, is the great discovery, of so much use in obviating the sinner's objection? Perhaps however, we shall find it in attending to the Reviewer's application of his principles.

What then is the objection of the sinner to be obviated? The sinner says, "If I am dependent on divine grace, there is no good and sufficient reason, why, when called to duty, I should act or even think of acting in the performance of duty." The Reviewer says, "This objection is not, as it is often supposed to be, that the doctrine of dependence exempts the sinner from the obligation to make him a new heart and a new spirit—but that it renders all *effort* to do this on the part of the sinner *useless*." p. 46. To this I replied in the Strictures, that in my apprehension, the very point of the objection relates to the sinner's obligation, and that the proper way to meet it, is, to exhibit clearly the ground or reason of his dependence, and to show that it does not cancel his obligation, or impair his ability to perform his duty. But the Reviewer says, "It is not an uncommon fact to find sinners admitting fully their obligations to immediate repentance, and still insisting that in view of their dependence, there is nothing to be done on their part." To this I reply, that it is no uncommon fact, for sinners, whose hearts are deceitful above all things, to bely their own professions, and to admit in *words* what they do not admit in *reality*. And that they do not in *reality* admit their obligations to immediate repentance when they make the above objection, is perfectly evident; for the very object of their plea, is, to *excuse* and *justify* their disobedience. If this is not their object, what is it? Will the Reviewer inform us? If they *really* admit their obligations to immediate repentance—they admit that they are able to repent—that the duty is reasonable—that they have no excuse—that all their objections and excuses are swept away—that they have nothing to say, but must stand guilty and speechless before God. Accordingly, I said in the Strictures, that "when the sinner says, I see and feel that it is my reasonable duty to repent, but such is the wickedness of my heart, that I never shall repent, until I am renewed by divine grace, this is not an objection, but the statement of a fact; and all that we have to do with it, is, to admit the truth of it in its full ex-

tent." The Reviewer insists however, that this is an objection, an objection which I have not answered, and which I have confessed myself unable to answer. But I would ask the Reviewer, if an acknowledgement of the truth, is an objection against the truth? If the sinner should say, I am convinced that I must repent or perish, would this be an objection? And if he should say, I am convinced that I must be born again, or I cannot see the kingdom of God, would this be an objection? But says the Reviewer,

"Suppose now that the sinner, with these statements of Dr. Tyler in view, should say, "There is no good and sufficient reason, why, when called to duty, I should act, or even think of acting in the performance of duty!" Would not this, we ask, be "*an objection?*" And we ask again,—how would Dr. Tyler answer the objection?" p. 47.

I admit that this would be an obligation; but the reader will perceive that this is a very different statement from that which I have said would not be an obligation. And I would answer the objection, by attempting to show the sinner, that his dependence does not cancel his obligations, or in the least degree, impair his ability to do his duty. But says the Reviewer,

"Suppose then the sinner to reply, "I admit all this—my natural powers—my obligation—the wickedness and perverseness of my heart;—my conscience condemns me—I have no excuse. But still, why should I act in the performance of duty," &c. p. 47.

I would say to him, if you admit your obligations, and admit that you are without excuse, why do you continue to make excuse? If you admit that all your objections are satisfactorily answered, why do you continue to urge them?

"*We* think however," says the Reviewer, "there is "a more excellent way;" even to assure the sinner, wicked as his heart is, and hopeless as his case is without the interposition of the grace of God; that it *may* prove to be the fact, that grace will be given him, and if he no longer remains inactive, his duty be done, when God is calling him to do it." p. 49.

I would seriously inquire whether this "more excellent way" of the Reviewer, is not directly calculated to take off the edge of divine truth, to soothe the conscience of the sinner, and to turn off his eyes from the desperate wickedness of his heart?—and whether it will not in fact, make the impression on his mind, that he is not *able*, and of course not under *obligation*, to do his duty without divine grace?

What is the sinner directed to do? To act—to make an effort. An effort to do what? His duty. But he hates his duty, and is unwilling to perform it. He is consequently unwilling to make an effort to do his duty; for an effort to do his

duty, implies an intention to do his duty, and that surely is a good intention. Still, however, the sinner flatters himself that he is willing to do his duty, but cannot; and the "more excellent way" of the Reviewer, as it appears to me, encourages him to cherish this belief. He is told to make an effort, and *it may prove to be a fact* that divine grace will be afforded, and that he will do his duty. Suppose that he does make an effort, and as vigorous an effort as we can suppose a natural man, with no good intention, ever will make; and suppose the requisite grace is not afforded;—will he not feel that he has done what he was directed to do—and all indeed that he can do—and that it is not his fault that he has not done his duty? I appeal to every candid reader, whether this mode of treatment, would not be likely to produce this impression on the mind of the sinner? I ask moreover, would not this be a very injurious impression?

The person who adopts the Reviewer's "more excellent way," instead of showing the sinner that the only reason that he does not do his duty, is, that he is unwilling to do it; virtually admits the sinner's plea that he is willing to do what he can, and authorizes him to believe, that if he will act with such feelings as he has, God will peradventure give him repentance. Instead of urging him to act immediately with "good moral intention," he puts him upon making efforts with no good intention. He directs him to make efforts to obey God, with no intention to obey him, (for that would be a good intention,) believing that *it may prove to be a fact* that these efforts will result in obedience. The Reviewer, it appears to me, overlooks the character of the sinner, and encourages him to mistake his own character.

What does the Reviewer seem to suppose is the difficulty in the way of the sinner's doing his duty? An unwillingness? Then his direction amounts to this: If you are *willing* to do your duty, and will make an effort to do it, *it may prove to be a fact*, that God will make you *willing* to do it.

Besides, according to this scheme, the sinner is not to be directed to the immediate performance of duty. I know that the Reviewer has denied this consequence; and yet if I mistake not, it is involved in his principles. The sinner is directed to act, with no assurance that if he does act, he shall perform his duty; but only with the belief that *it may prove to be a fact* that he shall perform it. If then he complies with the direction, he *may* fail of doing his duty. Consequently the perfomance

of duty is not the thing to which he is directed. If directed to do his duty, he is authorized to believe that on compliance with the direction, he shall infallibly perform it. There is no peradventure in the case.

Besides—Do the scriptures ever direct men to act on the ground that *it may prove to be a fact* that they will do their duty? On the contrary do they not call men to the direct performance of duty? Do they direct sinners to act with no good intention, i. e. without intending to do their duty, and to believe that by thus acting, *it may prove to be a fact*, that they will do their duty? I have not so learned the scriptures. But the scriptures direct men to "*strive*," to "labour," &c. True. But do they direct them to strive and labour with no good intention? Do they direct men to do any thing with no good intention? The Reviewer says, "there is no reason for attempting to do any thing, when it is *certain* that it will not be done:" p. 49. He here virtually represents those whom he opposes, as teaching sinners that it is *certain* that they will not do their duty, even if they attempt to do it; whereas directly the reverse of this is the fact. We teach them that if they attempt to do their duty, they will infallibly perform it—not merely that *it may prove to be a fact* that they will perform it. We teach them that the only reason that they do not do their duty, is, that they are unwilling to make the attempt. The Reviewer, however, seems to suppose that they may attempt to do their duty, and still fail, because the requisite grace shall not be granted. If so, then grace is needed to remove not a moral, but a natural inability.

"If," says the Reviewer, "to exhibit ability and obligation is *all* that is necessary to render immediate action in the performance of duty rational, then Satan and lost men, instead of sinking in despair under the prospect of endless sin and guilt, should, if they would act rationally, no longer regard the divine declaraction, "he that is filthy, let him be filthy still;"" p. 49.

And does the Reviewer suppose that it is more rational for Satan, and lost men, to persist in rebellion and in blaspheming their Maker, than it would be to cease from their rebellion? If so, it is doubtless more commendable. That course of conduct which is most rational, is evidently the most commendable. In the view of all holy beings, therefore, it is more rational, and more commendable, for Satan and the lost spirits in hell, to blaspheme their Maker, than it would be to love and praise him. And why? Because they have a disposition to do it, and because it is *certain* that God will never change their

disposition. On the same principle, if a man has a disposition to lie, aud swear, and steal, and commit adultery; and if he were to know that God has given him up to walk in the way of his own heart, it would be more rational, and more commendable for him to work all these abominations, than it would be to become a sober and pious man.

The Reviewer says, "we would ask, why then are not devils and lost men urged to the performance of duty?" p. 50. And does the Reviewer sappose that devils and lost men are excused from the performance of duty? This indeed follows from the principles which he has advanced. He has said, that "action in this case," (where there is a known certainty that a person will not act) "is in the most absolute sense impossible." By this he means physically impossible; for he adds, "Man act voluntarily, with the unqualified conviction that he shall not act! Then he may act voluntarily without motives." This is a physical impossibility, as he has himself asserted, pp. 6, 7, of his reply to the Strictures. Now it is a known certainty that devils and lost men will continue to disobey God's law. Consequently according to the Reviewer's statements, they are exonerated from blame, unless they are culpable for not doing, what it is physically impossible that they should do. He asks again,

"Why is there not the same reason, and all the reason, for an embassy to the world of punishment to urge its despairing spirits to the performance of their duty, as in this world of hope?" p. 50.

I answer—The fact that they are abandoned to hopeless perdition, may be a good reason, why no message of mercy should be sent to them; and, still be no good reason, why they should persist in their rebellion. If they are moral agents, and still under the moral law, it is their reasonable duty to obey it. They have no more excuse for disobeying it, than sinners in this world of hope. And if they have no excuse, they have no "good and sufficient reason" for their disobedience. The Reviewer said in his fourth number, "The calls of the gospel in this world of hope are not converted into mockery, by the assurance to any individual that they will not be obeyed." To this I replied, "What said Christ to the jews. *Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life.* Were his calls of mercy converted into mockery by this declaration?" In answer to this the Reviewer says,

"When Dr. Tyler shall prove, that Christ assured these persons, that they *never* would come to him, even through grace, under *any* call to duty,

and yet associated with this assurance the call to duty, then we will attempt to answer his question." p. 50.

And does the Reviewer mean to intimate that those whose opinion he is controverting, do assure sinners that they *never will come to* Christ even through grace? Does he not know, that he is evading the point? All which we maintain, is, that sinners will not come to Christ, except the Father draw them. Did not Christ teach the same doctrine? And if our representations convert the calls of the gospel into mockery, is it not equally true of his? Besides Christ did say, on one occasion, to the Jews, *ye shall die in your sins.* Were his calls of mercy converted into mockery by this declaration? See also Acts xxviii. 25—27.

"Dr. Tyler further says, "Suppose that a man intends to murder his neighbor, and fully believes that he shall, why should he refrain or even think of refraining, from such a horrid deed?"—We answer he should refrain at least for two reasons. One is, that he *can* refrain. The other is, that though he believes that he shall murder his neighbor, God has *not authorized* the belief." p. 50.

Here again, is evasion—The statement of the Reviewer on which my question was predicated, was, "What reason is there, why a man should act or even think of acting in given circumstances, when he knows or *believes* that he never shall act in those circumstances?" There is nothing said in this statement about a belief which God has authorized. I will here propose another question for the consideration of the Reviewer. After the prophet Elisha had informed Hazael what evil he should do unto the children of Israel, why should he refrain, or even think of refraining, from those barbarous deeds?

Again. The Reviewer has said, "Common sense decides that if it is a known or revealed truth, that the sinner under a present call to duty will not act, unless God do more than God is now doing, then let the sinner wait till God does more." According to this statement, the sinner is authorized to believe, not only that he *can*, but also, that there is no certainty that he *shall not* perform his duty, even if God should do no more for him than he is now doing; or else he is authorized to believe, that he has a good and sufficient reason for persisting in disobedience. Now every sinner under genuine conviction of sin, fully believes, that he never shall do his duty unless God does more for him than he is now doing; and every sinner who does not believe this, betrays consummate ignorance of his own heart.

Besides—If sinners are authorized to believe that there is

no certainty that they shall not repent, even if God does no more for them than he is now doing; then Christians may believe that when they repented, God did no more for them than he had previously done, and no more than he did for others who never have repented. *Who maketh thee to differ?* Again. If sinners are authorized to believe as above, then Christians may believe that sinners will repent and turn to God, although God should do no more for them, than he is now doing. Suppose they should express this sentiment in prayer: Lord, we do believe that sinners will repent and be converted, even if thou shouldest withhold thy special grace, and do no more for them, than thou art now doing. But says the Reviewer, "The grace that may attend any present call to duty, may be given in greater measure than any that preceded it." Be it so. Still the grace which is necessary to secure repentance, has not *yet* been given to the sinner who is *now* impenitent; and if it is a revealed truth, that the sinner will not repent without *that grace*, then according to the Reviewer's statement, he has a good and sufficient reason to wait till that grace be given.

"Dr. Tyler says, "Is it unreasonable for a sinner to act, when he is able to act?" What is this but playing on a double sense of terms? Every reader of the "Strictures" would conclude from this question, that we had denied the *obligation* of men to do their duty." p. 49.

That the reader may judge of the fairness of this representation, I would observe, that I quoted from the Review the following passage. "No matter, as it respects the *reasonableness* of acting, what the ground of the certainty is, that he shall not act, if this certainty be known or believed. That criminal *perverseness* of heart is the ground of the certainty, does indeed make a very material difference in respect to the sinner's *obligation to act*. Still if *he knows he shall not act*, the futility and consequent unreasonableness of acting, are as obvious as if the certainty were caused by chains of adamant:" pp. 704, 705. After quoting this passage, I asked, "And is it so? Is it unreasonable for a man to act, when he is *able* to act, and *under obligation* to act, merely because he is unwilling to act, and knows that he is unwilling?" The Reviewer, it will be seen, quotes only a part of my question, and represents me as having endeavoured to make the impression on the mind of the reader, that he "had denied the *obligation* of men to do their duty." I am sorry to say, that this is a specimen of the manner, in which the Strictures are frequently treated by the Reviewer. But the Reviewer says, my question is "playing upon a

double sense of terms." To this I would say, that if he uses terms with "a double sense," he ought to let his readers know in which sense he means to be understood. Besides, how is my question "playing upon a double sense of terms?" I have only quoted his language. I have not attempted to explain it. The Reviewer has certainly laid down the position, that it may be, in *some sense*, (in what sense I have not undertaken to say,) *unreasonable* for a man to act, when he is able to act, and *under obligation* to act. But I would ask, whether it can be unreasonable in *any sense*, for a man to act, when he is *able* to act, and *under obligation* to act? Can it *ever* be *unreasonable* for a man to do his duty? Can there *ever* be a "good and sufficient reason" for a man to refuse to do his duty? Can it *ever* be the duty of a man to do, what he has a "good and sufficient reason" for not doing? The Reviewer may, perhaps, reply to all these questions, by saying, they are only "playing upon a double sense of terms;" but his readers, I apprehend, will not consider this "a good and sufficient" answer.

But let us turn one moment to the Reviewer's coadjutor, E. P. He says,

"But the author of this query says it is "easy." Is it not, according to his philosophy, *impossible!* If his philosophy be true, when the sinner says he *cannot* love God, he tells the truth. And as to "the way to meet this evil," there is *no* honest way to meet it, for it is not a cavil: But Cicero was right, "Ut nihil interest, utrum nemo valeat, an nemo valere possit." You may tell a sinner, perhaps that he ought not *to be* a sinner; but do not tell him that he can help it. You may awaken *regret* in his soul, but not *remorse*. You then shift your position, and tell him it *would* be easy, if he only had "right motives." Ah! if he had right motives. If a man had wings he could fly! If he had right motives, he would *be* holy. Why tantalize him thus? Why not tell him plainly, that he *cannot* put forth a holy act?" pp. 31, 32.

To act with right motives, is to act with a good intention. When we say that it would be easy for the sinner to do his duty, if he had right motives, the meaning is, it would be easy for him to do his duty, if he were willing to do it. Let E. P. now apply his reasoning to a familiar case. Suppose he has a stubborn, undutiful child, who refuses to obey his reasonable commands, and who says that he cannot obey them. But you can, if you will. Ah! if I will. If I had wings I could fly. Why do you tantalize me thus? You may tell me that I am a disobedient child, but do not tell me that I can help it. Tell me plainly that I cannot obey you. Again. Suppose E. P. has a debtor, who refuses to pay him an honest debt. Have you not the means? Yes, I have the money in my pocket, and I

acknowledge the debt to be due; but I have determined never to pay you. But you would pay me if you felt right. Ah! if I felt right. If I had wings I could fly. Why do you tantalize me thus? I do not feel right, and you know it. You may tell me, if yon please, that I am a dishonest man, but do not tell me that I can help it. Tell me plainly that I cannot pay you.

But says E. P. it is not easy I admit, but very difficult. Still if you will *try*—if you will *strive*—if you will make *desperate efforts* to *choose* to pay me, *it may prove to be a fact* that you will do it. If I will try? Just as if I really desired to pay you. If I wished to pay you, I could do it no doubt;—and if I had wings, I could fly. But I have no inclination to pay you; and of course, I have no inclination to try, or to strive, or to make desperate efforts to do it; and why do you tantalize me thus?

But says E. P. "The sinner really has natural ability to become holy. But is it easy?" Yes, so far as natural ability is concerned. Is it difficult for a holy being to love God? But what natural power has he, which the sinner has not? "We well know indeed," says E. P. "that if a sinner were not a sinner, it might be as easy for him to be holy as to be sinful. But when we address him, ought we not as the Bible does, to assume that he is a sinner?" Certainly—And we ought also to assume as the Bible does, that his depravity is not a calamity merely, but a crime; and instead of soothing his conscience with representations which are calculated to turn off his eyes from his real character, we ought to bring home to his conscience the naked truths of the gospel, and throw upon him the whole responsibility of continuing for a moment a rebel against God.

In regard to the agency of the Divine Spirit, the Reviewer says, "We have never called in question the doctrine of an immediate or direct agency of the Holy Spirit in regeneration." p. 52. I am happy to be informed that his views on this point have been misapprehended. I did understand him to maintain, that the Divine Spirit operates not directly on the mind, but only through the medium of truth or motives. This principle, I supposed to be involved in the whole tenor of his reasoning respecting the suspension of the selfish principle, and to be distinctly advanced, when he said, "if there were no way to overcome this strong man" (the selfish principle) "exept by *direct assault*, then for aught we can see, the moral transformation of the soul, were hopeless even to Onipotence." By

direct assault I understand him to mean the direct agency of the Holy Spirit; and I must confess, that I cannot now conjecture what else he could mean.

"But," says the Reviewer, "we still say, as we said before, that if there were nothing in the mind of the sinner to which the motives of the gospel can be addressed, except the selfish principle; the moral transformation of the soul would in our view be hopeless to omnipotence itself. For what is the impossibility in the case? It is this, that enmity itself should be made to love the very object which it hates; or that a being who has *no capacity of feeling* motives, should yet feel them, and act under their influence." p. 52.

I do not deny that sinners have a "*capacity* of feeling motives." What I maintain, is, that they resist the motives of the gospel. That they do this till the selfish principle is suspended, the Reviewer admits. If this is to deny that they have any "*capacity* of feeling motives;" then the Reviewer denies that they have any such capacity till (according to his last statements) the identical moment of regeneration. But cannot God give efficacy to motives, which, of themselves are utterly inefficacious? Although the sinner resists the motives of the gospel, and is unwilling to yield obedience, cannot *God work in him to will and to do of his own good pleasure?* Cannot "Omnipotence produce holy love in such a being"? But "How?" says the Reviewer, "Not by causing enmity itself to love." Very true: But if God by an act of his power, takes away the enmity of the sinner's heart, by shedding abroad his love there; is this causing enmity itself to love? And is this impossible to Omnipotence? If so, I still say as I said before, not "sarcastically," but seriously, wo to the world! We be all dead men!

The Reviewer says, "Dr. Tyler maintains what may be termed PHYSICAL REGENERATION. By this we mean, a *change* in the sinner, prior to, and distinct from right voluntary action." E. P. also has repeatedly made the same charge. But have I not said, "undoubtedly the change is *ordinarily* produced when truth is present to the mind, and the *actual exercise* of holy affections is an *immediate* effect of the divine operation?" Is this maintaining that the change in the sinner, is "*prior to*, and *distinct from* right voluntary action?" But I have spoken of a direct influence upon the heart "preparing it to receive the truth, and yield to the motives which truth presents." By this, however, all which I meant, was, that when divine truth is made effectual, it is by a special divine influence, and that this influence is exerted upon the mind, and not upon the truth. I did not mean to affirm, that there is a preparation of heart antece-

dent to, and distinct from, right voluntary action. But says the Reviewer, "it will not be claimed that the mind acts right, *before* it yields to the motives which truth presents." Very true. But the mind acts right *when* it yields to the motives which truth presents. "Is then this *act* the same thing as this *preparation* of the heart?" Certainly, according to my representations, the very same: for I have said, the "actual exercise of holy affections, is an *immediate* effect of the divine operation." The Holy Spirit gives efficacy to divine truth, by causing the mind to yield to the motives which truth presents. The reader can judge therefore, whether I have "unequivocally asserted the necessity of a change of heart, *prior to*, and *distinct from*, right action."

The Reviewer says, "Dr. Tyler afterwards describes this change more fully. 'We are so constituted' he says, 'that when an object is presented to the mind, we *like* or *dislike* it, are *pleased* or *displeased;* and these feelings when exercised towards moral objects are of a moral nature." But the Reviewer knows, that in this passage, I was describing the will. I said, "That every moral act, is a voluntary act, is doubtless true; if the will be understood to include in its operations the affections, and to be as Edwards defines it 'the faculty by which the soul does not behold things as an indifferent unaffected spectator, but either as *liking*, or *disliking*, *pleased* or *displeased*, *approving* or *rejecting*." Now does not the Reviewer believe that we are so consituted that we possess a will? And when I speak of right acts of the will, is this speaking of something *prior to*, and *distinct from*, right voluntary action?

But I maintain, the Reviewer says, that a person can be regenerated in sleep, or in a delirium. This however I have not maintained. I have not affirmed that regeneration ever did take place, or that it ever *can* take place in sleep or in a delirium. What I have said, is that "I do not feel authorized to say—that God *cannot* regenerate a person in sleep or in a delirium." This declaration was occasioned by what appeared to me, the bold assertions of the Reviewer. I do not profess to know enough of the state of the human soul in sleep or in a delirium, nor of the extent of almighty power, nor of the manner in which the divine spirit operates upon the human mind, to feel authorized to assert *positively* that such an event is impossible to Omnipotence. If the Reviewer has attained to such knowledge, I can only say, that I have not, as yet, been so

highly favoured.* But we are not reasoning respecting persons asleep, or insane, but respecting those who are in the full possession of their rational powers. In respect to such, I have maintained as explictly as the Reviewer, that the effect produced by the Spirit of God in regeneration, is right voluntary action. Nor am I conscious of having said any thing inconsistent with this—or any thing which has warranted the assertion of the Reviewer, that I "clearly teach, that the depravity of man is a *physical* depravity, and that the change in regeneration, is a PHYSICAL change."

"Such, if we mistake not, is the fundamental error that pervades all Dr. Tyler's reasonings, on the subject in discussion. They are in perfect keeping, with the three-fold impossibility, that a sinner should so use truth as to obey it; as well as his constant assumption, that there is no susceptibility in man to truth, but the selfish principle; which in the *very nature of things*, must hate truth the more clearly it is seen. Dr. Tyler never seems to have thought that the moral inability of a sinner to perform right moral action, lies in that certainty of continued sin, which coexists, and is perfectly consistent with, every power and property of moral agency." p. 54.

In regard to the three-fold impossibility, I trust the mind of the reader is already satisfied. As to there being "no susceptibility in man to truth but the selfish principle," I maintain nothing more on this point, than the Reviewer maintains, in regard to every sinner, antecedent to the suspension of the selfish principle. I believe that the sinner possesses "every power and property of moral agency," and that this is perfectly consistent, with his being supremely selfish. The Reviewer must maintain the same, or deny that sinners possess the powers and properties of moral agency, antecedent to the suspension of the selfish principle. The question at issue, therefore, between me and the Reviewer is not, what is a free moral agent—or whether man is such an agent—or whether self-love is an essential attribute of moral beings—or whether regeneration is a physical change—but whether the selfish principle is suspended in the sinner's heart, antecedent to regeneration?—In other words, whether man is not supremely selfish—that is, entirely depraved, *till* his heart is renewed by divine grace? This question has ever been considered the *turning point* of the discussion, between those who admit, and those who deny the doctrines of grace. It is true, that the Reviewer does not deny these doctrines. I have expressed my belief that he never will.

* Suppose the Reviewer were called to visit a dying man in a delirium, who, he had reason to apprehend, was still unrenewed; I would ask whether he feels so sure that his regeneration, in these circumstances, would be impossible even to Omnipotence, that he would consider it wrong to pray for his regeneration?

But that those who shall come after him, and who shall adopt his principles, will not follow them into their legitimate consequences, I have no reason to believe. This is the ground of my fears; and of the fears of multitudes through the land. In expressing these fears, I am not influenced (unless I entirely mistake my motives) by any unfriendly feelings towards the Reviewer or his associates. I still cherish, and shall continue to cherish, for them "those sentiments of respect and esteem which are the fruits of a long and endeared intimacy;" and I do most earnestly conjure them to pause—and while they reflect on the extensive influence which their station enables them to exert, to ponder well the course which they are pursuing. I ask them to consider, whether the fears of their brethren are not entitled to some regard; and whether there is not, at least, a possibility that these fears may be not altogether without foundation?

In conclusion, I will only add, that if, in the course of debate, any expressions have escaped me, which to an impartial reader may seem uncandid, or unreasonably severe, no one can regret it more deeply than myself. While I have felt it my duty, to expose with great plainness, what I deem to be the errors of the Reviewer, I have intended to do it in a Christian manner, and with a Christian spirit. If I have failed in this attempt, I ask no indulgence from the reader.